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PAY BACK TIME IN SUDAN? DARFUR IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Nsongurua J. Udomband
"Human rights must prevail over human wrongs. International law
must prevail over international crime."'
- Mr. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Pace Peace Center
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations (U.N.) Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost
organ with the repetitive primary mandate of maintaining international
peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the
U.N. It made history on March 31, 2005 when it adopted Resolution 1593,3
empowering the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to
f © 2005 Nsongurua J. Udombana. LL.B. (Hons.), LL.M. (Univ. of Lagos); LL.D.
Candidate (Univ. of South Africa); Associate Professor of Law & Director, Center for
Human Rights, Central European University, Budapest; udombanan@ceu.hu. Professor
Udombana writes on international law and the judicial process-with an Afrocentric
outlook-and has published widely in international legal journals. He extends his gratitude
to Professor Karoly Bard, for his critical comments on this manuscript, and to the editors of
the Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law but takes responsibility for any
remaining error.
1. Benjamin B. Ferencz, a former Nurnberg prosecutor, Address to the Rome
Conference on Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court at Pace Peace Center $
7 (June 16, 1998), http://www.un.org/icc/speeches/616ppc.htm [hereinafter Ferencz,
Address].
2. U.N. Charter 1945, art. 24, $$ 1-2 [hereinafter U.N. Charter]. One of the purposes of
the UN is "[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." Id. art. 1, 91 1.
3. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (March 31, 2005) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1593].
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investigate grave crimes allegedly committed in Darfur, western Sudan.
Resolution 1593 is historic for being the first UNSC referral since the 1998
Rome Statute establishing the ICC entered into force on July 1, 2002.'
Resolution 1593 itself sets July 1, 2002 as a point of departure for
investigations of the alleged Darfur crimes,6 predictably because the
jurisdiction ratione temporis of the ICC takes effect from the date its
constitutive treaty entered into force
Darfur is the fourth referral after the entry into force of the ICC
Statute; the other three are state referrals. In December 2003, the
Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, referred the situation concerning
the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC Prosecutor;' the Prosecutor
has already determined that there is a sufficient basis to investigate the
charges against the LRA.9 In early 2004, the President of the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) referred the ICC Prosecutor to crimes allegedly
committed in the territory of the DRC, which crimes fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court. The DRC asked the Prosecutor to investigate
these allegations in order to determine if one or more persons should be
charged with such crimes, and the authorities committed to cooperate with
the Court.' ° In January 2005, the Prosecutor received a letter from the
Government of the Central African Republic (CAR), referring the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court committed anywhere on the territory of
the CAR since the enactment of the ICC Statute.'
4. See id. 11.
5. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, June 15 - July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/RomeStatute_120704-EN.pdf [hereinafter ICC
Statute].
6. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 3, 1.
7. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 11, 1 ("The Court has jurisdiction only with
respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute").
8. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation
Concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 29, 2004), available at
www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease-details&id=16&1=en.html.
9. See id. For analysis, see Payan Akhavan, The Lord's Resistance Army Case:
Uganda's Submission of First State Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J.
INT'L L. 403 (2005).
10. For updates on the referral, see Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Prosecutor
Receives Referral of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (April 19, 2004),
available at www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease-details&id=19.html.
11. For updates on the referral, see Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Prosecutor
Receives Referral Concerning Central African Republic (Jan. 7, 2005), available at
www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=87.html.
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All four referrals-Uganda, DRC, CAR, and Darfur-emanate in
Africa and each is connected to conflict, seemingly confirming stereotypes
that the continent is perpetually at war with itself.12 The now defunct
Organization of African Unity (OAU) gave credence to these stereotypes, when
it stated, "Africa, at present, holds the record of inter-state wars and conflicts.""
It might well be that the international community is using Africa as an
experimental ground for the emerging norms and institutions of
international criminal justice, with African states wittingly encouraging
such an experiment. The last decade has seen an increasing criminalization
of Africa, including the two ad hoc tribunals-the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone's
War Crimes (Special Court)-that are still sitting in the continent. The
international community, especially the African Union (AU), must find
lasting solutions to Africa's peace, security, and development challenges. It
is wrong to mistake a particular medicine-international criminal justice-
as the elixir of Africa's many ailments.
This article examines the question of accountability in Sudan and
justice for victims of the Darfur atrocities. In welcoming the UNSC's
decision to confront impunity, the article will explore the roots and
relevance of Resolution 1593, and reflect on challenges facing the
Prosecutor and the ICC in this quest. The first part explores factors that
led to the referral and situates the Darfur crisis in the context of state
failure, resulting from years of autocracy and instability that define Sudan.
It also examines the report of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry (UNCI) on
Darfur, which largely influenced the adoption of Resolution 1593.14 The
second part examines the source of authority for Resolution 1593, and
assesses its significance vis-a-vis the ICC, perpetrators of the Darfur
crimes, their victims, and the cause of justice generally. In the third part,
the article reflects on matters arising from the Darfur referral, including
questions of admissibility. The Rome Statute, for example, requires the
ICC to "satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction" and that the case is
12. See generally ANTHONY CLAYTON, FRONTIERSMEN: WARFARE IN AFRICA SINCE 1950
(1999); and CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA: ROOTS AND RESOLUTION (Taisier Ali & Robert
Matthews eds., 1999).
13. OAU, Yaound6 Declaration (Africa: Preparing for the 21st Century), 6, OAU Doc.
AHG/Decl.3 (XXXII) (July 8-10, 1996), available at
www.africanreview.org/docs/govern/yaounde.pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 2005) [hereinafter
Yaounde Declaration].
14. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 3, pmbl (referring to the Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur).
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admissible."i It even permits the Prosecutor to "seek a ruling from the
Court regarding a question of jurisdiction or admissibility."16
The article concludes by appealing to the international community to
give all necessary support to the ICC in order to fight impunity, which is a
major reason for grave and gross human rights violations in the world. 7 As
to methodology, the article employs the traditional legal exegesis, with
prescriptions embedded in the textual analysis.
II. THE ROAD TO THE HAGUE
Several remote and immediate causes led to the search for
international criminal justice in Sudan, and in particular, the referral of
Darfur to the ICC. This part explores these events, including the
recommendations of the UNCI, and join issues with the absentee members
of the UNSC on Resolution 1593.
A. State Failure and the Darfur Conflict
"A state," says Henry Kissinger, "is by definition the expression of
some concept of justice that legitimizes its internal arrangements and of a
projection of power that determines its ability to fulfill its minimum
functions-that is, to protect its population from foreign dangers and
domestic upheaval."'8 There are strong reasons to believe that today's
Sudan does not fit Kissinger's attributes of a state. One reason is that
Sudan has the hallmarks of a failed state,19 which occurs when a state is
15. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 19, 1i 1.
16. See id. art. 19, 3.
17. See U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances, Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment - Question of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances,
18-19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.411990113 (Jan. 24, 1990), reprinted in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 473 (Neil Kritz ed.
1995); cf. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Res. on Impunity, 8, U.N. Doc. E/2002/23-
E/CN.4/2002/200 (April 26, 2000) ("Convinced that the practice and expectation of
impunity for violations of international human rights or humanitarian law encourage such
violations and are among the fundamental obstacles to the observance of international
human rights and humanitarian law and the full implementation of international human
rights and humanitarian law instruments .. ") [hereinafter Resolution on Impunity].
18. HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? TOWARD A
DIPLOMACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 20 (Simon and Schuster 2001) (stressing that when
"these elements are in flux simultaneously... [then] a period of turbulence is inevitable").
19. See Gerard Prunier & Rachel M. Gisselquist, The Sudan: A Successfully Failed State,
in STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR 101 (Robert I. Rotberg
[Vol. 13:1
PAY BACK TIME IN SUDAN?
"utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international
community. 20 From a "service delivery" perspective, state failure occurs
when the authority within a state is "unable to provide the most
fundamental services that make up the state's obligations in its contract
with society.",2' Among these services include physical security, basic health
care, education, transportation and communications infrastructure,
monetary and banking systems, and a system for resolving disputes.22 It
also includes the inability to impose law and order, as in civil wars,
revolutionary wars, genocides, politicides, and adverse or disruptive
regime transitions.23
Of course, the failed state phenomenon is not always intentional, and
the attempt to situate all conceivable problems in such a phenomenon
could lead to reductionism. Outside intervention could, in itself, be both a
symptom of and a trigger for state collapse. Some commentators argue
that "the failed state discourse is rooted in the hypocrisy of the major
transnational system that brought conveniently "the failed state" rhetoric
to deny culpability., 24 Thus, a failed state may be subject to involuntary
restrictions of its sovereignty, such as political or economic sanctions, the
presence of foreign military forces on its soil, or other military constraints,
such as a no-fly zone. Nevertheless, the state collapse in Sudan is not due
to the implacable tides of great issues beyond human control; it is squarely
the "failure of leadership, 25 including Omar El-Bashir's fanatical
application of Taliban-style Islamic law that discriminates against non-
Muslims.
Darfur, where the Government of the Sudan (GoS) wars against its
population, has become a byword for impunity, a wilderness of atrocity
and crime, and probably the world's worst humanitarian disaster. The
problem started sometime in February 2003, when some rebel groups-the
ed., 2003) [hereinafter STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS] ("The Sudan today is
indeed a failed state").
20. Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POLICY 3
(1992-1993), available at www.foreignpolicy.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). See generally
Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in
STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS, supra note 19, 3 (discussing the flawed institutions
and infrastructure associated with failed states); Gary King & Langche Zeng, Improving
Forecasts of State Failure, 53(4) WORLD POLITICS 623 (2001).
21. See Ben N. Dunlap, State Failure and the Use of Force in the Age of Global Terror, 27
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 453, 458 (2004).
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Mammo Muchie, Wanted: A Union Government, NEW AFRICAN, Dec. 2001, at 38-39.
25. G. NORMAN ANDERSON, SUDAN IN CRISIS 274 (1999).
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Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and later the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM)-accused the Arab-ruled GoS of decades of malign
neglect and oppression of black Africans in favor of Arabs. Acting on
Victor Hugo's philosophy-that rebellion is the language of the unheard,
these groups saw rebellion as their only remaining option to shake off a
yoke they no longer wanted to shoulder.26 The result was a SLA attack on
government military forces at El Fasher in north Darfur in April 2003. The
GoS was not being in possession of sufficient military resources to repel
the attacks-arguably because many of its forces were still locked in a
long-drawn civil war in the south. The GoS, therefore, allegedly recruited a
militia composed of a loose collection of fighters, but mostly of Arab
background, known as the "Janjaweed"-literally "devils on horseback"-
to respond to the rebellion." With active government support, the militias
attacked and continue to attack villages, systematically targeting civilian
communities that share the same ethnicity as the rebel groups, killing,
looting, forcibly displacing people, destroying hundreds of villages and
polluting water supplies.
The extensive media reports of atrocities in Darfur compelled the
UNSC to adopt Resolution 1566 on September 18, 2004,28 requesting the
Secretary-General, inter alia, to-
rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in
order immediately to investigate reports of violations of
26. See United Nations High Commissioner, Report of The United Nations High
Commissioner For Human Rights and Follow Up To The World Conference On Human
Rights, May 7, 2004, Situation of Human Rights in the Darfur Region of the Sudan, T[ 5,
E/CN.4/2005/3 [hereinafter Situation of Human Rights in Darfur].
27. International Commission of Inquiry on Darfar, Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, Jan. 25, 2005, T 66 [hereinafter
UNCI Report] available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com-inq-darfur.pdf. See also
id. 67 ("From available evidence and a variety of sources including the Government itself,
it is apparent that faced with a military threat from two rebel movements and combined
with a serious deficit in terms of military capabilities on the ground in Darfur, the
Government called upon local tribes to assist in the fighting against the rebels."). Cf
Human Rights Watch, Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International
Crimes in Darfur, Vol. 17, No. 17(A), at 1 (Dec. 2005), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/darfur1205text.pdf [hereinafter Entrenching
Impunity] (stating that the GoS recruited the Janjaweed militias "through informal
networks of ruling party insiders, former military personnel, and leaders of nomadic
tribes"). See also id. at 9 ("[T]he Sudanese government recruited the "Janjaweed" militias
as the main ground forces for the government's counterinsurgency campaign in Darfur.").
28. S.C. Res. 1564. U.N. Doc. S/Res/1564 (2004). The resolution was adopted under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
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international humanitarian law and human rights law in
Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts
of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators
of such violations with a view to ensuring that those
responsible are held accountable.
The UNCI submitted its report on January 25, 2004, confirming that
the GoS, in its response to the insurgency, has committed acts against the
civilian population in Darfur. It established clear links between the
Sudanese State and the Janjaweed militias, and stated that militias "have
received weapons, and regular supplies of ammunition which have been
distributed to the militias by the army, by senior civilian authorities at the
locality level."30 The UNCI also found that the Sudanese armed forces
have committed vast attacks on civilians in Darfur villages.31 It noted that
many of the alleged crimes, which were committed "directly or through
surrogate armed groups," have been widespread and systematic, thus
amounting to "gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law."3
The UNCI established "two irrefutable facts about the situation in
Darfur."'33
Firstly, there were more than one million internally
displaced persons (IDPs) inside Darfur (1,65 million
according to the United Nations) and more than 200,000
refugees from Darfur in neighbouring Chad to the East of
the Sudan. Secondly, there were several hundred destroyed
and burned villages and hamlets throughout the three states
of Darfur 4
Noting that the Sudanese justice system has demonstrated its inability
and unwillingness to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of the
crimes,35 the UNCI "strongly" recommended to the UNSC to refer the
Darfur situation to the ICC, as the crimes "meet all the thresholds" of the
ICC Statute.36 It also recommended the establishment of a reparation
29. Id. 12.
30. UNCI Report, supra note 27, at 1 111.
31. See id. at 240.
32. Id. T 185.
33. Id. 226.
34. Id.
35. See id. 647.
36. UNCI Report, supra note 27, at T 647.
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system for the victims of the crimes, whether or not perpetrators have been
identified. 7 Two months after the UNCI Report, the UNSC responded by
adopting Resolution 1593, referring the Darfur situation to the ICC.
Resolution 1593 expressly referenced "the report of the [UNCI] on
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in
Darfur. ' '38 Subsequent parts of this article will explore the wider
implications of the resolution; but the next segment joins issues with the
absentee UNSC members.
B. Joining Issues with Absentee States
Resolution 1593 was adopted by a vote of 11 in favor,39 none against,
with 4 abstentions-Algeria, Brazil, China, and the United States (U.S.).
China and the U.S., the two permanent absentee members, are not parties
to the ICC Statute; but their abstentions appear to have been strategic in
order to avoid a possible veto, given their well-known opposition to the
ICC.
1. China's Position
In explanation of their position after the vote, the Chinese
representative to the U.N. argued that the referral should have been done
with the consent of the GoS.40 He, however, failed to indicate how the
international community could have obtained such consent from an
intransigent regime. Before Resolution 1593, the UNSC had adopted a
number of resolutions, each expressing concern over the Darfur crisis and
declaring the crisis a threat to international peace and security.4 In
37. See id. at 649 ("The Security Council should, however, act not only against the
perpetrators but also on behalf of victims. In this respect, the Commission also proposes the
establishment an International Compensation Commission, consisting of fifteen (15)
members, ten (10) appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General and five (5) by an
independent Sudanese body.").
38. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 3, pmbl.
39. The 11 members that voted for the resolution are Argentina, Benin, Denmark,
France, Greece, Japan, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Tanzania, and United Kingdom. See
Press Release, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm [hereinafter UNSC Press Release
8351].
40. See id. (Wang Guangya, the China's representative, reporting to the UNSC).
41. See S.C. Res. 1556, pmbl. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004); S.C. Res. 1590,
pmbl.,U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1556] ("Determining
that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and
security."); and S.C. Res. 1591, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005) [hereinafter
S.C. Res. 1591]. On the meaning of "threat to the peace," see LELAND GOODRICH,
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Resolution 1556 of 1994, the UNSC expressed "its grave concern at the
ongoing humanitarian crisis and widespread human rights violations,
including continued attacks on civilians that are placing the lives of
hundreds of thousands at risk."42 The resolution called on all parties to the
conflict to refrain from any violence against civilians.43 This resolution did
not prize the parties to do so; in fact, it was the first in a series of
frustrations that the UNSC was going to experience with Khartoum.
On March 29, 2005, the UNSC adopted a sanctions resolution to
provide for targeted sanctions on travel and assets for those officials and
individuals who are complicit in the atrocities in Darfur and in contributing
to the general problems in Sudan." The resolution directed U.N. Member
States to ensure that none of their nationals, or persons within their
territories, made resources available to, or for the benefit of, perpetrators
of Darfur crimes or such entities." It directed the Secretary-General to
appoint a sanctions panel, in consultation with a committee made up of all
the members of the UNSC. Like previous resolutions, the sanctions
resolution has not prompted Khartoum to take steps towards stopping the
atrocities in Darfur. Against this background of reiterated failure and
incessant peril, it is not clear how the GoS could have given its consent to
the Darfur referral.
2. The U.S. Position
The U.S., on its part, argued that "it did not agree to a Council
referral of the situation in Darfur to the Court. 4 6 At a press conference on
April 1, 2005, the U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, explained her
country's decision to abstain rather than veto Resolution 1593:
Sudan is an extraordinary circumstance. I believe that it was
Secretary Powell who talked about the fact that we believe a
genocide is being committed in Sudan. Whatever you want
to call it, there are clearly crimes against humanity being
committed in Sudan and there are people who have to be
held accountable for those crimes .... It is a humanitarian
crisis, it is a moral crisis, and it is a crisis that is
EDVARD HAMBRO, & ANNE PATRICIA SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 295-97 (3d rev. ed. 1969).
42. S.C. Res. 1556, supra note 41, pmbl.
43. See id. pmbl. & $ 5.
44. S.C. Res. 1591, supra note 41, pmbl.
45. See id.
46. UNSC Press Release 8351 supra note 39 (Anne Woods Patterson, reporting to the
UNSC).
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extraordinary in its scope and in its potential for even
greater damage to those populations.47
Earlier, the U.S. representative to the U.N. had noted: "While the
United States believed that a better mechanism would have been a hybrid
tribunal in Africa, it was important that the international community spoke
with one voice in order to help promote effective accountability."48 It
seems that the U.S. had in mind the type of hybrid Special Court jointly
established between the Government of Sierra Leone and the U.N. in 2000
to prosecute perpetrators of grave crimes during that country's brutal civil
war.49 Although hybrid tribunals have some promise-of legitimacy,
capacity, and norm penetration,0 they are not the "be all" or "end all" of
events. Even the Special Court project in Sierra Leone is not quite a
success story as to serve as a precedent elsewhere in Africa.
The Special Court is having credibility and financial problems, largely
because the international community is giving half-hearted support to the
Court. Nigeria, which ironically is a member of the Management
Committee of the Special Court, has been harboring Charles Taylor,
Liberia's former rebel leader turned ruler, since August 2003.1 Taylor has
47. Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks with Hungarian Foreign Minister
Ferenc Somogyi After Meeting at the Treaty Room in the White House 1 11 (April 1,
2005), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/44104.htm.
48. See UNSC Press Release 8351 supra note 39.
49. The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone's War Crimes (Special Court
Statute), is an integral part of the Agreement Between the United Nations and the
Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
Oct. 4, 2000 [hereinafter Agreement]. The Agreement, in turn, is an annex to the Report of
the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone. See The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the Establishment of a Special Court
for Sierra Leone, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915/Annex (Oct. 4,
2000). For a commentary on the Special Court, see Nsongurua J. Udombana, Globalization
of Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone's War Crimes, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 55
(2003).
50. Laura A. Dickinson, Comment, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
295 (2003) (setting out three basic arguments in support of hybrid tribunals). According to
Dickinson, hybrid tribunals have legitimacy as they are locally situated and involve local
actors as prosecutors, adjudicators and defenders. They also enhance capacity building by
contributing to the legal training of local personnel. The third promise is that of norm
penetration, that is, introducing international legal norms into the local context in a way
that is not simply an imposition. See id.
51. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Accountability for International Crimes: Charles
Taylor and the Nigerian Burden, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 103 (Evelyn A. Ankumah & Edward K. Kwakwa eds., 2005) (addressing the
dilemma posed by Taylor's asylum in Nigeria).
[Vol. 13:1
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been charged as a person bearing the greatest responsibility for grave
crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity committed
during the gruesome civil war in Sierra Leone.52 Recently, Justice
Emmanuel Ayoola, then President of the Special Court, reminded the
UNSC that Taylor's trial is crucial for the "strong impact that this would
have on the perception that the people of Sierra Leone and of Africa have
of the Special Court and of similar institutions, and on the Court's
contribution to combating the culture of impunity."53
Funding for the Special Court has almost dried up, and with only a
few months until the end of its mandate, 5' the Court has not completed a
single case let alone handing down a conviction. The root of the problem is
the Court's normative deficiency, as it was not established under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, unlike similar ad hoc experiments in the former
Yugoslavia 5 and in Rwanda. 6 In other words, the Special Court is not
funded from the assessed contributions of U.N. Member States; it is a
donor-driven institution and has been left to "carry bowls begging for
financial grants from states and institutions."57 Such an experience
certainly does not advance the legitimacy and credibility of any institution
created for international criminal justice. Darfur requires an institution
that will have less time sourcing for funds and more time dispensing
criminal justice.
52. See Prosecutor v. Charles G. Taylor, Case No. SCSL - 03 - 01 (2003) available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSC-03-01-I-001.pdf (March 3, 2003) [hereinafter
Taylor's Indictment]. This and other indictments before the Special Court are available on
the website of the Special Court. See www.sc-sl.org [hereinafter without any cross-reference
referred to as Special Court Web site].
53. Briefing to the Security Council by Justice Emmanuel Olayinka Ayoola, President,
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, May 24, 2005, available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/ayoola052405.pdf [hereinafter Special Court Briefing].
54. There is a likelihood of an extension of the Court's mandate beyond the December
2005 dateline.
55. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
adopted May 25, 1993; S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter
ICTY Statute].
56. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for
Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States,
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, adopted Nov. 8, 1994; S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); amended by S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1165 (April
30, 1998) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
57. Udombana, Globalization of Justice, supra note 49, at 128.
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3. Algeria's Position
Algeria, one of two non-permanent members to abstain from the
Resolution 1593 vote, reasoned that "the [AU] was best placed to carry
out so delicate an undertaking because it could provide peace, while also
satisfying the need for justice."" Some African leaders, including the
Chairman of the AU, have also floated the idea of an African led tribunal
for Darfur. Such calls are certainly good for the AU's image, but they
seriously exaggerate the institution's capacity to restore lasting peace in
Sudan and give justice to victims and perpetrators of the Darfur mayhem.
The issue at stake is not whether Africa should be allowed to manage its
affairs but whether the AU has the institutional capacity to punish
impunity in Sudan. The AU has noble goals59 and probably means well for
Sudan, but it is a child that is still learning to walk on its own. Many of its
vital organs are non-existent, including the proposed AU Court of
Justice, 6' which in any event, will not exercise jurisdiction over
individuals.61
Lack of political will on the part of Member States also conspire
against an effective AU involvement to stop the carnage in Sudan. Almost
three years into the Darfur mayhem, the AU has managed to muster only
approximately 7,000 personnel from Member States for its African Mission
in the Sudan (AMIS).62 This number is made up of 686 military observers,
4,890 troops and 1,176 civilian police.63 Until October 2005, the force level
58. UNSC Press Release 8351, supra note 39 (reporting Abdallah Baali, Algeria's
representative to the UNSC).
59. The AU was established in 2000 and inaugurated in 2002, with the goal, inter alia, of
achieving greater unity and solidarity between African counties and peoples and promoting
peace, security, and stability in Africa on the continent. See Constitutive Act of the African
Union (AU), adopted July 11, 2000, entry into force May 26, 2001, art. 3 (a)&(f),
CAB/LEG/23.15 (2000), amended by the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act
of the African Union, July 11, 2003 [hereinafter AU Act]. Among the principles that guide
the Union is peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States through such
appropriate means as the AU Assembly may decide upon as well as peaceful co-existence
of Member States and their right to live in peace and security. Id. art. 4(e)&(i).
60. A Court of Justice is an organ of the AU. See id. art. 5. Its statute, composition and
functions are defined in a separate protocol, pursuant to Article 18(2) of the AU Act. See
Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, adopted during the 2nd Ord. Sess. of
the AU Assembly, July 2002 [hereinafter Protocol of AU Court], available at www.africa-
union.org [hereinafter without any cross-reference referred to as AU Web site].
61. The personal jurisdiction of the Court will be limited to States and inter-
governmental organizations. See Protocol of AU Court; see id. art. 18.
62. See Communiqud of the 17th Meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC),
Oct. 20, 2004, 4, PSC/PR/Comm.(XVII) [hereinafter PSC Communiqu6 17] (enhancing
the AMIS).
63. See id. T 7.
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was about 2,000 troops, with a weak mandate of AMIS to monitor and
observe compliance with ceasefire agreements between the GoS and rebel
groups. The mandate was slightly modified in October 2005 to include:
"Protect[ing] civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in
the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood
that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the
GoS." 64
The present writer insists that AMIS, as currently constituted, is still
not the firewall needed to stop unremitting atrocities in Darfur. The force
is beset with poor logistical planning and a lack of funds, such that
belligerents do not seem to notice its presence. As the ethnic cleansing
continues in Darfur, AMIS is busy "picking up the pieces and muddling
through, doing too little too late." The AU itself is complicit in the
continuing impunity in Sudan. In December 2005, for example, the AU
allowed the GoS to chair the meeting of its Peace and Security Council
(PSC) in Addis Ababa; Sudan is also hosting the January 2006 AU
Assembly Summit in Khartoum.6 ' The AU has chosen to disregard the
elementary lesson that buying off bad behavior only encourages more.
The point is that Africa's variety and Sudan's peculiarity clearly
inhibits a concerted action by the AU, but the scope of the Darfur crisis
certainly demands a significant response by the UNSC. Refreshingly, the
U.N. Secretary-General and UNSC are reviewing their options on Darfur,
including having the U.N. take over the peacekeeping function from AMIS
possibly when its current mandate expires on March 31, 2006.
4. Brazil's Position
Brazil, which chaired the UNSC at the time, was the second of the
non-permanent members to abstain from Resolution 1593 vote. Its
representative insisted that Brazil favored the resolution though it
abstained because of its operative paragraph 6 of Resolution 1593 (limiting
the reach of the ICC) which, according to him, would not strengthen the
64. Id. 6. Its further mandate includes: "Protect[ing] both static and mobile
humanitarian operations under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within
capabilities." Id.
65. See Human Rights Watch, Sudan: A Shameful Place for an African Summit (Nov.
2005), available at http://hrw.orglenglish/docs/2005/11/17/africa12047.htm (calling on the
AU not to reward the sponsors of crimes against humanity with the honor of hosting its
summit or ascending to its presidency).
66. See UN Weighs Options for Sudan's Darfur Region As Funds for African Union
Force Run Low, U.N. NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 12, 2006, available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=17146&Cr=sudan&Crl=.
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role of the Court. 7 Brazil, in effect, decided to throw the baby away with
the bath water!
What, in any event, is the effect of abstention from a UNSC vote,
particularly by a permanent member? International legal scholars have
long debated this question, based on different interpretations of the U.N.
Charter.68 The Charter calls for "the concurring votes of the permanent
members" if the UNSC is adopting a substantive resolution69 but contains a
proviso that seems to distinguish abstention from a "concurring vote[.] 70
The proviso was originally interpreted as identifying a narrow category of
cases in which a permanent member's abstention would not obstruct any
substantive decision.7' The practice of the UNSC seems to establish that
abstention of a permanent member does not affect the legality of a
substantive resolution, a position that the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) also maintains in the South West Africa case.72
III. THE LEGALITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RESOLUTION 1593
After determining the legality of Resolution 1593, this part examines
the significance of referral, in the broader context of the ICC's relevance
to the quest for international justice and accountability in Darfur
A. The Source of Authority for Resolution 1593
By what authority does Resolution 1593 anchor? The first hook may
be found in the triggering mechanism of the ICC, which is an autonomous
procedure and constitutes a key component of the procedural system of
67. See UNSC Press Release 8351, supra note 39 (reporting Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg,
Brazil's representative to the UNSC).
68. See Yuen-Li Liang, Abstention and Absence of a Permanent Member in Relation to
the Voting Procedure in the Security Council, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 694 (1950). See also
Frederic L. Kirgis Jr., The Security Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 506, 510
(1995).
69. See U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 27, 91 3.
70. See id.
71. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONF. SER. No. 71, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON THE
RESULT OF THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE 71-77 (1945); FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1258-60 (1945).
72. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16,22 (June 21) [hereinafter South West Africa Case].
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the ICC Statute.73 States parties to the Statute granted to the Court a
deactivated jurisdiction that is activated only when a particular crisis
"defined by personal, temporal[,] and territorial parameters" occur.74 The
potential jurisdiction of the Court could be activated under three
situations.75 The first is if "[a] situation in which one or more of such crimes
appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State
Party in accordance with article 14.",7 The second is if the UNSC, acting
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, refers to the Prosecutor any
''situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed. 7 7 And the third is if "[t]he Prosecutor has initiated an
investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with article 15."78
For a "State Party" referral, the ICC Statute requires, at a minimum,
state acceptance of the jurisdiction of. the Court;79 the territorial state or
state of nationality must either be a party to the statute or have accepted
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in
question.' Sudan does not meet the requirement for a "State Party"
referral under the ICC Statute. Even if it did, there is little hope of the
GoS ever initiating such a referral, since Khartoum is a participant-victim
in the Darfur saga. This makes a UNSC referral the most viable option,
obviously a progressive development of international law. During the
elaboration of the U.N. Charter, attempts were made to empower the
UNSC to refer matters to the ICJ. These efforts were thwarted at San
Francisco."l The U.N. Charter, however, included what Frederic Kirgis
refers to as "a potentially significant provision for enforcing the Court's
73. See generally ICC Statute, supra note 5, arts. 5, 71, 75, 85 (covering criminal and civil
proceedings that are distinct from the triggering procedures).
74. H6ctor Ol6solo, Guest Lecture Series of the Office of the Prosecutor, The Triggering
Procedure of the International Criminal Court, Procedural Treatment of the Principle of
Complementarity, and the Role of Office of the Prosecutor 5 (Mar. 26, 2004),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/040326 Olasolo.pdf.
75. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 13; see also Oldsolo, supra note 74, at 5.
76. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 13(a); cf. id. art. 14 ("A State Party may refer to the
Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for
the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with
the commission of such crimes.").
77. Id. art. 13(b).
78. Id. art. 13(c); cf. id. art. 15(1) ("The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio
motu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.").
79. See id. art. 12(2)-(3).
80. See id.
81. See RUTH B. RUSSEL ASSISTED BY JEANNETTE E. MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 661 (1958).
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judgments," 2 referring to Article 94(2) of the Charter, which authorizes the
UNSC, "at the request of the prevailing party in the ICJ proceedings, [to] decide
upon measures to be taken to give effect to the [Court's] judgment."
By permitting the UNSC to refer situations to, or defer situations
from, the ICC, architects of the ICC Statute were "render[ing] homage to
the Security Council's decisive contribution in the renaissance of penal
international law."83 Some believe that Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute,
which permits UNSC referral, "situates the ICC on a continuum with
[earlier] ad hoc international criminal tribunals," such as the ICTY and
ICTR. ' This makes the ICC an "'ad hoc permanent' international criminal
tribunals"85 at the disposal of the UNSC for the prosecution of
international crimes "without the need to establish new tribunals. ' '86 The
difference, however, is that the ad hoc tribunals (properly so-called) are
subsidiary organs of the UNSC, albeit one with judicial characters.87 The
ICC is not; it actually wrest some powers from the UNSC, by effectuating a
change in interstate relations and removing an important category of
interstate disputes out of the realm of diplomacy, where the UNSC holds
court, to the realm of compulsory adjudication.'
The second hook that anchors Resolution 1593 is the U.N. Charter,89
which mandates the UNSC to "determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to "decide what
measures shall be taken" to maintain or restore international peace and
security.90 The UNSC exercises a wide discretionary power in determining
the existence of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of
aggression.9" The ICC Statute itself did not define the extent of the
UNSC's powers or situations in which it is proper for it to exercise those
82. Kirgis Jr., supra note 68, at 509.
83. Luigi Condorelli & Santiago Villalpando, Referral and Deferral by the Security
Council, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A





87. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 29 ("The Security Council may establish
such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions").
88. Cf. Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party
States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 25-26 (2001).
89. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 3, pmbl (invoking Chapter VII of the Charter).
90. U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 39.
91. Cf. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 29 (Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic Motion].
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powers. The travaux preparatoires indicates that this omission was
• 92
deliberate, but the Statute allows the UNSC to refer only "[a] situation in
which one or more ... crimes appears to have been committed." 93 This
phraseology was debated and agreed upon essentially to allow the UNSC
to refer to the ICC a general matter or situation, rather than a specific
case.94 The rationale was to preserve the Court's independence in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.9' Thus, the bringing of individual prosecution is
a matter within the discretion of the ICC, based on investigations by the
Prosecutor.96
Clearly, Resolution 1593 constitutes a measure "not involving the use
of armed force"97 within the meaning of Article 41 of the U.N. Charter.
Some commentators have argued that as a precondition for the exercise of
its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, the UNSC should first
determine the existence of a factual situation objectively identifiable and
constituting a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of
aggression.98 It is only after such a determination, the argument continues,
that the UNSC can decide whether one or more of the crimes in Article 5
of the ICC Statute have been committed. 99 This proposition is like
preaching to the choir, since the practice of the UNSC reflects such an
approach. An example was Resolution 808 of 1993, which established the
92. See Preparatory Committee, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 1 129-31, delivered to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (Sept. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Report of the Preparatory
Committee].
93. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 13(b) (emphasis added); Cf. id. arts. 13(a), 14(1),
15(5)-(6), 18(1), 19(3) (employing the word "situation").
94. Cf. Oldsolo, supra note 74, at 5 (arguing that "[t]he [ICC] Statute uses the expression
situation... to refer to exceptional circumstances-not structural ones-that constitute a
departure from the status quo ... [which] are easily distinguishable from the more
restrictive content of the expression 'case').
95. Lionel Yee, The International Criminal Court and the Security Council: Articles 13(b)
and 16, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE
143, 147 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE].
96. See id. See also Ad Hoc Committee, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, $$ 120-21, delivered to the General
Assembly, A/50/22 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report].
97. U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 41.
98. See Oldsolo, supra note 74, at 5. The ICC does not yet have jurisdiction over the
"crime" of aggression. It will only do so when states have agreed on its definition and set
out conditions for the Court's exercise of jurisdiction. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 5(2).
99. See, e.g., F. Lattanzi, The Rome Statute and State Sovereignty: ICC Competence,
Jurisdictional Links, Trigger Mechanism, in ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 51, 62-63 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds.,
1999).
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ICTY.'° The resolution was adopted after the UNSC expressed "its grave
alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of international
humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former
Yugoslavia."' 1 It then concluded that the situation constituted "a threat to
international peace and security'01°2 and declared its determination "to put
an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to justice the
persons who are responsible for them.
1 3
On the eve of the establishment of the ICTY by the UNSC, the
Permanent Representative of France wrote to the Secretary-General
arguing that "the establishment of a [ad hoc] Tribunal would be an
appropriate measure if... it seems likely to attain or facilitate the
objective of restoring international peace and security."'' "° A few years
later, the ICTY Appeals Chamber upheld the validity of the creation of
the ICTY by the UNSC under its Chapter VII mandate.'5 The preliminary
conclusion from this brief analysis is that the Darfur referral is both
legitimate and legal, as was the previous institutional arrangements by the
UNSC under its Chapter VII mandate.
B. The Significance of the Darfur Referral
The Darfur referral is significant in many respects. Resolution 1593 is
a tacit recognition of the ICC by the U.S. and China-their abstentions
notwithstanding; and such recognition is a vital first step towards giving the
ICC the legitimacy it needs to achieve true universality. In adopting
Resolution 1593, the UNSC also implicitly acknowledges the important
role the ICC will play in the international criminal justice system,
complementing the UNSC in its primary responsibility of maintaining and
promoting international peace and security. Along with the ICJ, the ICC is
expected to contribute significantly to the legitimacy and perceived
fairness of the international order. The ICC Statute itself proclaims that
the crimes within the Court's jurisdiction "threaten the peace, security and
well-being of the world, 10 6 a proclamation that must be placed in the logic
100. S.C. Res. 808, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
101. Id. pmbl.
102. Id.
103. Id., cf. S.C. Res. 955, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the
ICTR, for similar wordings).
104. Letter from the Permanent Representative of France to the Secretary-General, UN
Doc. S/25266, at 13 (Feb. 10, 1993).
105. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Opinion and Judgment), 28-48, Case No. IT-94-1-
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of the U.N. Charter system. Architects of the ICC also intended it to relate
closely to the U.N.,'0 7 particularly the UNSC, which has the mandate to
adopt necessary measures to confront situations threatening international
peace and security.
The referral also removes any anxiety regarding the ICC's
competence to commence investigation and prosecution over Darfur, that
is, in the absence of UNSC approval. At the preparatory stages of the
Rome Statute, the International Law Commission (ILC) expressed
concern that there could be situations where the Prosecutor might be
unable to commence a proprio motu investigation, that is, where the
UNSC is already dealing with the situation under its Chapter VII
mandate.'9 The ICC Statute itself does not suggest such an interpretation,
although it permits the UNSC to make a deferral to the ICC requesting it
not to activate its potential jurisdiction with regard to a particular
situation.'°9
The referral is a big step towards restoring real peace in Sudan, since
peace cannot be bought at the price of justice. Prosecuting perpetrators of
the Darfur mayhem and making reparations to victims are essential for
victims to come to terms with their loss."0 Such an exercise could have a
positive impact on peace and security in Sudan,"' unless peace is intended
to be a brief interlude between conflicts."2 The process of accountability is
also the process of reconciliation and restoration of peaceful relations."'
107. See id. art. 2.
108. Cf. Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 23(3), Report of the
International Law Commission (ILC) U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc.
A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Report].
109. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 16. Such a request lasts for 12 months, though the
UNSC may renew it. See id.
110. Cf Michael Scharf, Justice Versus Peace, in THE UNrrED STATES AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (Sarah
Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE UNITED STATES AND THE ICC] (arguing that
prosecuting and punishing violators of grave crimes "would give significance to the victims'
suffering and would serve as partial remedy for their injuries.").
111. See UNCI Report, supra note 27, at Y/648.
112. Cf M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for
Accountability, 59 L. & Contemp. Prob., 9, 13 (1996).
113. See UNCI Report, supra note 27, at 648; cf. Luigi Condorelli & Annalisa Ciampi,
Comments on the Security Council Referral of the Situation in Darfur to the ICC, 3 INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 590, 592 (2005) (writing, "it is hardly questionable that investigations and
prosecutions of crimes perpetrated in Darfur before an independent, impartial and fair
institution is a means of removing serious obstacles to national reconciliation and the
restoration of peaceful relations in Darfur, thus contributing to international peace and
security"); Resolution on Impunity, supra note 17, pmbl ("Recognizing that accountability
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The referral also has the potential to deter vigilante justice, now or in the
future; it will discourage those who would want to seek revenge and take
justice in their own hands. On the other hand, and in the admirable words
of Louise Arbour, "The abandonment - even the postponement - of the
process of justice is an affront to those who obey the law and a betrayal of
those who rely on the law for their protection; it is a call for the use of force
in revenge and, therefore, a bankruptcy of peace.' '14
The Darfur referral is intended to serve as an instrument of truth and
memory. Truth "is the cornerstone of the rule of law""5 and the truth of
Darfur needs to be fairly, credibly, and transparently told. Criminal trials
of the nature envisaged by Resolution 1593 "can generate a
comprehensive record of the nature" and extent of violations, reveal "how
they were planned and executed, the fate of individual victims, who gave
[the orders]," and who carried them out.116 The ICC appears to be the most
credible institution to hear the Darfur story, given its "entirely
international composition and a set of well-defined rules of procedure and
of perpetrators, including their accomplices, for grave human rights violations is one of the
central elements of any effective remedy for victims of human rights violations and a key
factor in ensuring a fair and equitable justice system and, ultimately, reconciliation and
stability within a State").
114. Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Address to the UN
Commission of Human Rights, in U.N.: No More Delay on Darfur, Human Rights Watch,
Mar. 18, 2005 available at http:/hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/18/sudanlO337.htm (emphasis
added); cf Warren Christopher, in UN SCOR, 3175th mtg, 12-13, UN Doc. S/PV.1375,
(Feb. 23, 1993), in PAYAM AKHAVAN, JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE, PEACE IN THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA? A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL, 20
HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 750 (1998) ("[B]old tyrants and fearful minorities are watching to see
whether ethnic cleansing is a policy the world will tolerate. If we hope to promote the
spread of freedom, or we hope to encourage the emergence of peaceful, multi-ethnic
democracies, our answers must be a resounding 'no."').
115. CHERIE BOOTH, PROSPECTS AND ISSUES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
LESSONS FROM YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA, IN FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 157, 183 (Philippe Sands, ed., 2003).
116. See Scharf, Justice versus Peace, supra note 110, at 182; cf Antonio Cassese, On the
Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International
Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 2, 14 (1998) (stressing the commemorative potentials
of criminal trials). See generally LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT:
MAKING LAW AND HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST (2001).
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evidence.""' 7 As Michael Scharf asserts, "[t]he most authoritative rendering
of the truth is the crucible of a trial that accords full due process.''.
The UNCI has argued that resorting to the ICC is the most reasonable
and potentially effective option for ensuring justice over Darfur, "as the
investigation and prosecution in the Sudan of persons enjoying authority
and prestige in the country and wielding control over the State apparatus is
difficult or even impossible."'19 The UNCI also argues that trying the
crimes outside Sudan, "far away from the community over which those
persons still wield authority and where their followers live, might ensure a
neutral atmosphere and prevent the trials from stirring up political,
ideological or other passions."'2 The weakness in this argument is that if
the trial takes place at The Hague, it will pose problems in terms of access
by victims and potential witnesses given the distance between the two
countries. This plausibly explains why the UNSC has asked the ICC and
the AU "to discuss practical arrangements that will facilitate the work of
the Prosecutor and of the Court, including the possibility of conducting
proceedings in the region, which would contribute to regional efforts in the
fight against impunity.' 21 Such an arrangement could help in developing
infrastructures for the host country, though it will obviously be at the
expense of the Sudanese justice system that is in dire need of
rehabilitation.
Although the goals of penal sanctions remain controversial among
penologists,'22 deterrence always features prominently in such discourses.'
Consequently, the Darfur referral sends a very clear, strong, and
unmistakable signal to would-be violators of international criminal law
that impunity is not assured and that international crime is no longer
117. UNCI Report, supra note 27, at 648; cf. BOOTH, supra note 115, at 184 (arguing
that "the materials collected by the ICC which have passed its strict rules of admissibility of
evidence can contribute to the creation of objective accounts of events which will play an
important role in fighting forgetting").
118. Scharf, Justice versus Peace, supra note 110, at 182.
119. UNCI Report, supra note 27, at 648.
120. Id.
121. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 3, 3.
122. For exploratory studies on penology, see generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW
ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY (2d ed. 1998);
CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, & JUSTIFICATIONS (Rudolph J.
Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972); THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanley E. Grupp
ed., 1971); NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? (1991). See also Miriam J. Aukerman,
Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice,
15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39,44 et seq. (2002) (over-viewing goals of criminal justice).
123. See, e.g., ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES 81-84 (1998) (proposing deterrence,
retribution, and incapacitation as purposes of criminal punishment).
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tolerated.2 Deterrence, in this context, "refers to the attempt to integrate
or to reintegrate those persons who believe themselves to be beyond the
reach of international criminal law.' 25 Of course, the most potent
deterrent against crimes is not necessarily the length of the sentence
imposed, but the subjective assessment of the offender as to the likelihood
of his being indicted, arrested, tried and convicted.'26
Above all, the Darfur referral is significant, not for the mere
prosecutions and punishments of its perpetrators that will likely follow, or
even for reparations that might be provided for victims. Such acts, though
important in themselves, can never balance several thousands of innocent
and harmless lives that have been slaughtered on the altar of racial hatred,
the emotional trauma that survivors will be left to endure, and the valuable
properties that the GoS and its Janjaweed militias have mindlessly
destroyed. If the Darfur trial will have any significance, it will lie elsewhere
other than, or more appropriately, in addition to, the punishment that will
be meted out to perpetrators. Its legacy will be in the re-affirmation of the
right of all persons-black and white, women and men, children and
adults, poor and rich, weak and strong, Christians and Muslims, Jews and
Gentiles, including Animists-to live in peace and dignity with each other
regardless of their race, sex, status, or creed.
The present writer commends the UNSC for adopting Resolution
1593 to provide an appropriate mechanism that will lift the veil of impunity
in Sudan, an impunity that has allowed human wrongs to continue
unchecked in Darfur. Resolution 1593 is a victory for the rule of law, for
international justice, and for lasting and sustainable peace in Sudan. A
failure to respond to justice issues in Darfur "would have reduced the
124. Amnesty Int'l, Sudan: Who Will Answer for the Crimes?, Al Index: AFR
541006/2005, Jan. 18, 2005, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR540062005 [hereinafter Sudan: Who will
answer for the crimes?] (documenting serious international crimes committed in Darfur and
elsewhere in Sudan, and calling on the international community to take prompt action to
challenge the climate of impunity and lay the foundations for full reparations to victims,
justice, and durable peace in the whole country).
125. Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, 902 (July 31, 2003) ("Such
persons must be warned that they have to respect the fundamental global norms of
substantive criminal law or face not only prosecution but also sanctions imposed by
international tribunals. In modern criminal law this approach to general deterrence is more
accurately described as deterrence aiming at reintegrating potential perpetrators into the
global society") [hereinafter Stakic case].
126. See id.
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Council to irrelevance in ending impunity and protecting human rights and
international humanitarian law.,
127
IV. MATTERS ARISING FROM THE DARFUR REFERRAL
The Darfur referral raises several important issues, including the
question of jurisdiction, which lies at the heart of any judicial process. A
court acts in futility if it latter turns out that it lacked both personal and
material jurisdiction. Related to jurisdiction is the question of
complementarity, which is very sensitive given that the existence of the
ICC is a challenge to sovereignty. Then there are questions of sovereign
immunity, which may be invoked given the involvement of top Sudanese
government officials in the Darfur fray; the exclusion of the ICC's
jurisdiction with respect to certain category of persons; cooperation with
the Court, including funding; and of course, compensation for victims of
the Darfur atrocities.
This part examines the legal and practical issues arising from the
Darfur referral. In general, the ICC Statute does not contain specific
regulations on UNSC referral, unlike "States Parties" referral or proprio
motu investigation by the Prosecutor. This means that regulations
governing investigations and prosecutions of the alleged Darfur crimes can
only be by analogies and inferences from the provisions of the ICC Statute,
U.N. Charter, and comparative jurisprudence.
A. Investigation and Prosecution
Article 53 of the ICC Statute provides the legal basis for the start of
investigation. Some commentators, however, contend that this article is a
sui generis procedure in the case of a UNSC referral, since there is no
opponent, and that Article 18's admissibility proceedings are
inapplicable."8 This means that, with regard to the situation referred to by
the UNSC, the Prosecutor is simply "entrusted with [the power to take]
the final decision whether or not to activate the potential jurisdiction of
the Court."'29 From the point of view of legal analysis, Article 53 allows the
Prosecutor to initiate an investigation "having evaluated the information
made available to him."'3 To take this step he must determine that there is
a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, a determination that is
127. UNSC Press Release 8351, supra note 39, at 4 (reporting Lauro Baja, Philippine
representative to the UNSC).
128. OlIsolo, supra note 74, at 9.
129. Id.
130. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 53(1).
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part of prosecutorial discretion-"the principal manifestation of the
statutory principle of prosecutorial independence, as... expressed in
declaratory and functional terms in [A]rticle 42" of the Statute."'
Determining a reasonable basis for investigation, however, involves
satisfying three conditions laid down in the statute. The Prosecutor must
first determine whether the information available to him provides a
reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC
has been or is being committed,'32 that is to say, genocide,'33 crimes against
humanity,' and war crimes.135 Secondly, the Prosecutor must determine
whether "[t]he case is or would be admissible under Article 17" of the
Statute."' Thirdly, the Prosecutor must determine whether, "taking into
account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not
serve the interests of justice. ', 137
Comparatively, the jurisprudence of the ICTY sets out four
requirements for determination whether a violation should be subject to
investigation, as per Article 3 of the ICTY Statute:
the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of
international humanitarian law.
the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to
treaty law, the required conditions must be met.
the violation must be "serious," that is to say, it must
constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values,
and the breach must involve grave consequences for the
victim.
131. See also Morten Bergsmo & Pieter Kruger, Initiation of an Instigation, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 701, 702 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) ("The
principle of the independence of the Office of the Prosecutor is based on the interest of
impartial justice on which the credibility and legitimacy of the criminal justice process
depends.").
132. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 53(1)(a); cf. id. art. 22(1) ("A person shall not be
criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the
time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.").
133. See id. art. 6.
134. See id. art. 7.
135. See id. art. 8.
136. Id. art. 53(1)(b).
137. Id. art. 53(1)(c).
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the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or
conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of
the person breaching the rule.'38
The "information" referred to in Article 53(1)(a) of the Rome Statute
primarily relates to information accompanying the referral. In the case of
Darfur, it is expected that the UNSC has already supplied the Prosecutor
with all supporting documents at its disposal. This includes, presumably,
the sealed file that the UNCI handed over to the U.N. Secretary-General
having names of persons believed to be responsible for the Darfur crimes.
If the referral had been priopro motu, under Article 13(c), then the
Prosecutor is authorized to seek additional information to enable him to
make a suitable analysis of the situation in question.09 Some commentators
believe that there is no reasonable ground to prevent the Prosecutor from
taking liberty to obtain such additional information even in "States Party"
or UNSC referrals. The purpose of the provision, they argue, "is to ensure
that the Prosecutor has a sufficient basis to consider the seriousness of the
information received before taking steps to launch a full
investigation .... 140
If the above argument is correct, and logic and common sense support
it, then the Prosecutor, in establishing preliminary violations of
international criminal law, should also investigate "reports" of such
violations committed by all parties to the conflict. He should examine, inter
alia, the report of the UNCI, which, as earlier indicated, found that crimes
against humanity and war crimes have been committed in Darfur. The
UNCI, however, was hesitant on genocide;' before deciding whether or
not to prosecute for genocide, the Prosecutor should examine other
reports from the AU and other inter- and non-governmental
organizations, local and international media, and academic experts.
The ICC Statute provides a safeguard to prevent any possible abuse
of prosecutorial discretion. In the case of proprio motu investigation, the
Statute obliges the Prosecutor to obtain the authorization of the Pre-Trial
Chamber before embarking on an investigation.' 2 No such authorization is
required for investigations arising from UNSC referrals, but the
138. Tadic Motion, supra note 91, 94.
139. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 15(2).
140. Bergsmo & Kruger, supra note 131, at 705.
141. For a critique of the UNCI's conclusion on the question of genocide, see Nsongurua
J. Udombana, Escape from Reason: Genocide and the International Commission of Inquiry
on Darfur, INT'L LAWYER (forthcoming spring 2006, on file with author).
142. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 15(3).
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regulations of the ICC require the Prosecutor to inform the Presidency in
writing as soon as he receives an Article 13(b) referral.'43 He is also
expected to "provide the Presidency with any other information that may
facilitate the timely assignment of a situation to a Pre-Trial Chamber."'"
The ICC Statute also expects the Prosecutor to determine that a
reasonable basis exists before proceeding on an investigation.14 This
requirement of reasonableness appears in several provisions of the Statute,
in the context of assessment of information and evidence. Article 58(1)(a),
for example, provides for the Pre-Trial Chamber to have "reasonable
grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the
jurisdiction of the court.', 46
Some commentators have argued that the requirement of "reasonable
grounds" is less stringent than the "beyond reasonable doubt" criterion
applicable to the weighing of evidence at trial and that it amounts to no
more than assessing the evidence to show "the existence of a prima facie
case against one or more perpetrators., 147 This reasoning is based on the
fact that "only evidence untested in the specific case under preparation is
available prior to confirmation hearing and trial., 148 Nevertheless, these
safeguards are necessary because the decision of whether or not to
prosecute is among the most important decisions the Prosecutor has to
make. Furthermore, these cases are often "infused with political
implications."1
49
In identifying perpetrators to prosecute, the Prosecutor must exercise
due diligence to avoid partial justice, though some difficulties should be
143. See International Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, Regulation 45, U.N.
Doc. ICC-BD/01-01-04 (May 26, 2004), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Regulations-of-theCourt_170604-
EN.pdf [hereinafter ICC Regulations].
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 5, arts. 15(3), (4) & (6); 53(1)(a) & (1)(c).
146. Id. art. 58(a)(1).
147. Bergsmo & Kruger, supra note 131, at 706.
148. Id.
149. Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510, 510
(2003); cf Silvia A. Fern6ndez De Gurmendi, The Role of the International Prosecutor, in
THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 95, at 175, 181 ("Those who argued
against granting proprio motu powers to the Prosecutor feared an overzealous or politically
motivated prosecutor targeting, unfairly or in bad faith, highly sensitive political situations.
Sometimes [the I.C.C. Prosecutor was] feared as a 'lone ranger running wild' around the
world with excessive powers .... ). See generally Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Prosecutorial
Discretion Before National Courts and International Tribunals 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 124
(2005).
[Vol. 13:1
PAY BACK TIME IN SUDAN?
envisaged, given the mass atrocities committed in Darfur. The same due
diligence is expected in the investigation of crimes. Thus, the ICC Statute
enjoins the Prosecutor to respect the interests and personal circumstances
of victims and witnesses, including age, gender, and health, taking into
account the nature of the crime, in particular where it involves sexual
violence, gender violence or violence against children.50 Given the global
character of the ICC, its statutory provisions and limited resources,"' the
Prosecutor must make broader strategic investigative and prosecutorial
choices. The ICC Prosecutor has itself indicated that, as a general rule, it
will "focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those
who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or
organisation allegedly responsible for those crimes. ""' However, the choice
of who to prosecute must be informed by intelligent analysis. The
standard, to use the UNCI's formula, requires "a reliable body of material
consistent with other verified circumstances, which tends to show that a
person may reasonably be suspected of being involved in the commission of
a crime. '
It is necessary, before concluding this segment, to note that the ICC
Prosecutor, on June 6, 2005, concluded that the statutory requirements for
initiating an investigation in Darfur were satisfied.'54 In arriving at this
decision, the Prosecutor conducted what he called a "thorough analysis,"
after receiving the UNCI Report, "request[ing] information from a variety
of sources, leading to the collection of thousands of documents ... [and]
interview[ing] over 50 independent experts.', 5
150. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 54(1)(b).
151. See ICC, Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC Doc.
ICC-OTP 2003, at 7, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_PolicyPaper.pdf [hereinafter Policy Paper] (defining a
general strategy for the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, highlighting the priority tasks to be
performed and determining institutional frameworks capable of ensuring the proper
exercise of its functions).
152. Id. (italics in the original).
153. UNCI Report, supra note 27, at 524 (italics in the original).
154. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, The
Prosecutor of the ICC Opens Investigation in Darfur, U.N. Doc. OTP/LSU/066-05, (June 6,
2005), available at
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B. Darfur and the Challenge of Complimentarity
The discipline of international criminal law is regulated through
multiple legal regimes, with domestic courts as primary legal regimes.
Transnational criminal justice is primarily meted out by domestic courts,
which apply domestic law based on provisions of criminal codes, special
criminal laws or through the implementation of treaty provisions into
domestic criminal law. 156 National investigations and prosecutions, where
they can properly be undertaken, are normally the most effective in
bringing offenders to justice. States normally have the best access to
evidence and witnesses and their enforcement agencies are usually at the
disposal of the national prosecution system.'
57
Conscious of the need to maintain a balance between national
sovereignties and demands of international criminal justice, the ICC
Statute enshrines the principle of complementarity and accords primacy to
national legal systems for crimes within the Court's jurisdiction. The
Preamble to the Statute states implicitly that the effective prosecution of
crimes of international concern "must be ensured by taking measures at
the national level and by enhancing international cooperation" and calls
on "every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible
for international crimes." These provisions, which restate existing norms
according to which states have obligations to prosecute and punish such
crimes,"' is supported by an explicit announcement that the ICC "shall be
complimentary to national criminal jurisdictions."'5 9 The Statute confirms
these preambular provisions in Article 1 and works out its details in
Articles 17 and 20."6 Article 17 deals with questions of admissibility, while
Article 20 deals with the ne bis in idem rule. The ne bis in idem rule
protects both an accused person and the Court; an accused person from
156. See Ilias Bantekas, Head of State Immunity in the Light of Multiple Legal Regimes
and Non-Self-Contained System Theories: Theoretical Analysis of ICC Third Party
Jurisdiction against the Background of the 2003 Iraq War, 10 J. CONF. & SEC. L. 21, 24
(2005) (arguing that the domestic legal regime is more coherent than those established
under ad hoc institutional arrangements, largely because domestic criminal jurisdiction with
regard to transnational offences emanated from treaty practice and customary law that
produced certain specific rules through time).
157. See Policy Paper, supra note 151, at 1-2.
158. Cf. id. at 5 ("[T]he principle underlying the concept of complimentarity is that States
remain responsible and accountable for investigating and prosecuting crimes committed
under their jurisdiction and that national systems are expected to maintain and enforce
adherence to international standards.").
159. ICC Statute, supra note 5, pmbl.
160. See generally K. Hall, The Principles of Complementarity, in THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE, supra note 95, at 41.
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being prosecuted twice for the same conduct, and the Court from
squandering its limited resources where justice has already been done."'
The principle of complementarity is akin to the local remedies rule
used in classic international law to protect state sovereignty against
"excessive infringement by state to state claims on behalf of private
individuals."162 The rule states that "a State should be given the opportunity
to redress an alleged wrong within the framework of its own domestic legal
system before its international responsibility can be called into question at
[the] international level." '163 The local remedies rule reinforces the
subsidiary and complementary relationship of the international system to
those of internal protection. To the extent possible, an international
judicial tribunal should be prevented from playing the role of a court of
first instance, a role that it cannot under any circumstances arrogate to
itself .9' However, the point of difference with the local remedies rule is
that the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals has essentially been
primary, whether with reference to the Nuremberg Tribunal or the ICTY
and ICTR.
A vital question is whether "national jurisdictions," in relation to
complementarity, are limited to states directly concerned with a given
crisis, that is, the territorial or nationality states? The answer must be in
the negative, since the ICC cannot be taken as a substitute for any of the
existing mechanisms for prosecuting "grave crimes" under international
humanitarian law (IHL)" The ICC merely complements these other
161. See John Jones & Steven Powles, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE 396 (2003).
162. Jost Delbruick, The Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule and the International
Protection of Human Rights: A Plea for a Contextual Approach, in DES MENSCHEN
RECHT ZWISCHEN FREIHEIT UND VERANTWORTUNG 213,217 (Jirgen Jekewitz
et al. eds., 1989).
163. A. A. CANCADO TRINDADE, THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF
LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1983).
164. See Aksoy v. Turkey, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260 (1996). For an analysis of the local
remedies rule in relation to human rights litigation and adjudication in Africa, see also
Nsongurua J. Udombana, So Far So Fair: The Local Remedies Rule in the Jurisprudence of
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 97 AM .J. INT'L. L. 1 (2003).
165. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50,
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 129, 75 U.N.T.S. 238 [Third Geneva
Convention]; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].
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mechanisms, meaning that other states, including non-states Parties to the
ICC Statute, can equally prosecute the most serious crimes of international
concern, based on the universality principle' 66 or under obligations arising
from IHL. H6ctor Oldsolo, thus, concludes that:
the investigations and/or prosecutions undertaken by the
national Courts of any State, Party or not-Party to the
Rome Statute, preclude the activation and exercise of its
jurisdiction by the ICC in as much as such States have
introduced in their national legislation the jurisdictional
links (territoriality, nationality of the accused or of the
victim, principle of universal jurisdiction) that they are
claiming to remain seized with a given matter.
167
In sum, the ICC is not a court of first instance; it is not even a court of
appeal; rather, it is a court of last resort .' The ICC is not allowed to
exercise jurisdiction over international crimes where national systems
genuinely investigate or prosecute such crimes. It is allowed to do so only
if it considers that national authorities are unwilling or-unable to carry out
genuine investigations and/or prosecutions.' 69 This will be the case where
proceedings before national courts are intended to shield accused persons
from criminal responsibility;17° or where there has been an unjustified delay
166. The universality principle allows any nation to prosecute a limited set of heinous
offenses, even absent any connection to the crime, due to their universal condemnation. See
generally STEPHEN MACEDO, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Stephen Macedo ed.,
2004) (setting out the "Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction"); Luc REYDAMS,
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (2003);
and Johan Van der Vyver, Universal Jurisdiction, 1999 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 107.
167. Olisolo, supra note 74, at 15.
168. Cf. Michael Scharf, The Case for Supporting the International Criminal Court, in
INTERNATIONAL DEBATE SERIES: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES RATIFY THE TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? 5, 7 (2002) (stressing that the ICC
"would be a last resort which comes into play only when domestic authorities are unable or
unwilling to prosecute.") (emphasis added).
169. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, arts. 17, 20(3); cf id. art. 20(3)(b) (allowing the ICC to
retry an accused person where former proceedings were "conducted in a manner which, in
the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice.").
170. See id. art. 17(2)(a); cf id. art. 20(3)(a) (allowing the ICC to retry an accused person
where former proceedings were done to shield the persons concerned from proper criminal
prosecution). Evidence of shielding may exist in diffeent forms, such as legislation, orders,
amnesty decrees, instructions and correspondence. An example of an explicit order was the
Barabarossa Jurisdiction Order issued by the German High Command in May 1941,
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in the proceedings in order to defeat the cause of justice;"' or where judges
are not independent and impartial; 2 or where the national legal system
has collapsed.'73 Other instances that could permit admissibility by the ICC
have been cited;'74 one is where the ICC and the territorial State
incapacitated by mass crimes agree that a consensual division of labor is
the most logical and effective approach; another is where conflicting
groups oppose prosecution at each other's hands, preferring an impartial
prosecution by a neutral ICC: "In such cases there will be no question of
'unwillingness' or 'inability' under article 17."'' 1
On the basis of the ICC Statute and general international law, the
ICC should have no difficulty in assuming jurisdiction over the alleged
Darfur crimes, since none of the conditions for complementarity holds in
Sudan. There is also no indication that any other state is willing to
commence proceedings over Darfur. Although Khartoum has reportedly
announced its intention to establish a special tribunal in Sudan to try
perpetrators of serious crimes in Darfur 76 there are reasons to believe that
such a tribunal, if established at all, will be a Kangaroo court. To be
credible, the tribunal would require Khartoum to take enormous and
effective efforts to ensure its independence and credibility, a situation that
is unlikely to occur given Khartoum's complicity in the commission of the
Darfur crimes.
The unwillingness or inability (or both) of the GoS to prosecute the
perpetrators of the Darfur atrocities is self-evident, though it may be
necessary to provide further proofs. The UNCI, for example, has stated
that the GoS has "failed to demonstrate that it had taken measures to
prosecute those involved in the attacks that had taken place [in Darfur]
since February 2003. '77 The Human Rights Watch collaborates:
establishing that for "crimes committed against inhabitants by the Wehrmacht and its
auxiliaries ... prosecution is not obligatory and would take place only if necessary for the
maintenance of discipline or the security of the Forces." THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND
TRIAL, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 29-31 (1994) (1949).
171. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 17(2)(b).
172. See id. art. 17(2)(c); cf id. art. 20(3)(b) (allowing the ICC to retry an accused person
where former proceedings were "not conducted independently or impartially").
173. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 17(3).
174. See Policy Paper, supra note 151, at 5.
175. Id.
176. See Hum. Rts. Watch, ICC Takes Key Step to Bring Justice to Darfur (June 6, 2005),
available at http:/hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/06/sudanllO76.htm.
177. UNCI Report, supra note 27, at J 428 (reporting also that the GoS cited "just one
case relevant to the Commission's mandate and on which the judicial system had taken
action in 2003.").
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The Sudanese government has failed to prosecute serious
crimes committed in Darfur. Instead of pursuing
accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed by government officials and Janjaweed
members, it has made no genuine effort to investigate-
much less discipline or prosecute-any of the individuals
responsible. Instead, it has created a facade of
accountability through sham prosecutions and created ad
hoc government committees that produce nothing."78
The government's unwillingness can also be discerned by its refusal to
rein in the Janjaweed militias, as repeatedly demanded by the international
community.179 These militias are consolidating "ethnic cleansing" by
attacking IDPs-mostly farmers-who try to return to their homes.
According to the Human Rights Watch, "[T]he Janjaweed are not only
persons whose criminal past is forgiven, they are also assured that they will
not have to face local criminal prosecution for any of the crimes committed
while pursuing and evicting, looting and pillaging, the ethnic groups
allegedly aligned with the rebels."'" There is, meanwhile, a growing
insecurity for humanitarian operations, as the recent arrest and phantom
charge of Paul Foreman-head of M6decins Sans Frontibres (MSF)-in
Khartoum attests. 181
As regards inability, the GoS will be unable to obtain the key
evidence and testimony, even if it was in a position to obtain the accused
persons. The reason is because of the near-collapse of the Sudanese justice
system. From a substantive legal perspective, the UNCI has stated that
178. Entrenching Impunity, supra note 27, at 1. See also id. at 52 ("Despite overwhelming
information that the Sudanese government has planned, coordinated, and implemented a
campaign of ethnic cleansing resulting in crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur,
not a single mid- or high-ranking civilian official or military officer has been investigated,
disciplined, or prosecuted.").
179. Both the UNSC and the AU have deplored the failure of the GoS to disarm the
Janjaweed militias, apprehend their leaders and associates and bring them to justice. See,
e.g., S.C. Res. 1591, supra note 41, T 1.
180. Hum. Rts. Watch, Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia
Forces in Western Sudan, Vol. 16, No. 6(A), at 49 (May 2004), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2004/HRWreport2.pdf [hereinafter
Darfur Destroyed].
181. See BBC News, Second Sudan Aid Worker Arrested (May 31, 2005), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4595911.stm. Paul Foreman was arrested by Sudanese
authorities on May 31, 2005, on the unproven claim that an MSF report on rape published
on March 8 violated Sudanese law and that the report is "false." Id.
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"The Sudan Criminal Act and the Criminal Procedure Act do not contain
substantive and procedural provisions that can be applied to the special
situation of crimes committed during an armed conflict." '82 From an
adjectival legal perspective, the judicial system will be incapable of
addressing the serious challenges resulting from Darfur.' Victims have
themselves expressed their lack of confidence in the ability of the judiciary
to act independently and in an impartial manner,"' and they have a reason
to be cynical, since there is little proof that the Sudanese judiciary is
effective. 185 The independence of the court in Sudan exists in rhetoric than
reality; as the UNCI reports, the judiciary has been seriously compromised
such that judges disagreeing with the executive in Khartoum often suffer
harassment or dismissal.8 6 Thus, even if the Sudanese courts were willing
to be seized of Darfur, there is no guarantee that an invisible hand in
Khartoum will not manipulate the conduct of proceedings to ensure that
accused persons are not found guilty.
These grounds should make any challenge to the ICC jurisdiction
based on the principle of complementarity unsustainable. Nevertheless,
the ICC must not put itself as a competitor for jurisdiction, since seizure of
jurisdiction by the ICC over the Darfur crimes does not necessarily solve
the problem of justice delivery in Sudan. Sudan is a war-torn country
marked by devastated institutions, exhausted resources, diminished
security, and a traumatized and divided population. The ICC must help the
country to come to terms with large-scale past abuses and, more
importantly, to re-establish the rule of law. Resolution 1593 itself calls on
the ICC, in collaboration with the international community, to support
domestic efforts towards promoting the rule of law, "protect[ing] human
rights and combat[ing] impunity in" Sudan.'87 Such a call is understandable,
since the ICC can only prosecute leaders who bear most responsibility for
the Darfur crimes-given its limited human and material resources,""leaving national jurisdictions to prosecute "lower-ranking perpetrators.' 8 9
182. Id. $ 470.
183. See id. 431. See also id. 647 ("The Sudanese justice system has demonstrated its
inability and unwillingness to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes").
184. See id.
185. See id. 438.
186. UNCI Report, supra note 27, at 432.
187. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 3, 4.
188. See Policy Paper, supra note 151, at 3 ("The Court is an institution with limited
resources.").
189. Id. (stressing, "The strategy of focusing on those who bear the greatest responsibility
for the crimes may leave an "impunity gap" unless national authorities, the international
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The ICC must, therefore, seize every opportunity-it should also
create opportunities-to support reform of Sudan's justice system and
help fill the country's glaring rule of law vacuum. The approach, to borrow
the language of the U.N. Secretary-General, "must be comprehensive in its
attention to all of its interdependent institutions, sensitive to the needs of
key groups and mindful of the need for complementarity between
transitional justice mechanisms."'9 °
C. Exemptions from Reach of the ICC
Resolution 1593 contains a problematic provision, which gives states
that are not parties to the ICC Statute exclusive jurisdiction over nationals,
current or former officials, and personnel they contribute to operations in
Sudan, as mandated by the UNSC or the AU. 91 This provision, which
should be read on conjunction with Resolution 1591,192 provides protection
for contributing states to the peacekeeping and related humanitarian
efforts in Sudan. The exemption, however, subsumes the independence of
the ICC to the political and diplomatic vagaries of the UNSC, which is
really unnecessary, as the ICC Statute contains necessary checks and
balances to prevent politically motivated prosecutions. Fears to the
contrary are wholly unwarranted. Richard Dicker, the director of Human
Rights Watch's International Justice Program, has also criticized the
exemption in Resolution 1593 as violating long-established principles of
jurisdiction. While welcoming the resolution as a historic step towards
justice for massive human rights violations in Darfur, Dicker nevertheless
argues that the exemption undermines the ICC's ability to prosecute those
personnel accused of crimes concerning operations in Sudan.
193
community and the Court work together to ensure that all appropriate means for bringing
other perpetrators to justice are used"). See also id. at 7.
190. The Secretary General, Report of the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, Summary, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004),
available at <http://documents-dds
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO4/395/29/pdf/NO439529.pdf?OpenElement> [hereinafter
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice].
191. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 3, 6.
192. See S.C. Res. 1591, supra note 41 (establishing the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),
with a view towards expeditiously reinforcing the effort to foster peace in Darfur).
193. See Human Rights Watch, U.N. Security Council Refers Darfur to the ICC U.N.
Security Council Refers Darfitr to the ICC Historic Step Toward Justice; Further Protection
Measures Needed (Mar. 31, 2005), available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/31/sudanlO408.htm ("The resolution's exemption is
offensive, and it sets no precedent for the future. We oppose this exemption giving non-
ICC states exclusive jurisdiction over personnel they contribute to Security Council or
African Union operations in Sudan").
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Dicker's criticism is rightly focused, but it is obvious that Resolution
1593 was a product of political conflict and compromise. The exemption
provision is "the voice of Jacob," and it is one out of similar exemptions
since the entry into force of the ICC Statute. In July 2002, the U.S. secured
UNSC Resolution 1422, which asked the ICC to defer any investigation or
prosecution of any case involving peacekeeping personnel acting under the
auspices of the U.N. and who are nationals of a state that are not parties to
the Rome Statute.194 The U.S. refused to renew the mandate of any U.N.
peacekeeping missions unless the UNSC passed that resolution, which
many characterized as "blackmail.""19 In 2003, the U.S. forced the UNSC to
make an exemption in Resolution 1497,96 in relation to U.N. operations in
Liberia-a State Party to the ICC Statute. The resolution provided, inter
alia, that-
current or former officials or personnel from a contributing
State, which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the [ICC],
shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that
contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising
out of or related to the Multinational Force of the [U.N.]
stabilization force in Liberia, unless such exclusive
jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing
State.'"
The U.S. has additionally negotiated a series of so-called "Article 98"
agreements,' g8 which blackmail several states-about a hundred-to sign
194. See Resolution 1422 of 2002, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1422 (2002). For a commentary, see C. Stahn, The Ambiguities of Security Council
Resolution 1422 (2002), 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 85 (2003).
195. See, e.g., Lloyd Axworthy, International Criminal Court: Stop the U.S. Foul Play,
GLOBE & MAIL, July 17, 2002, at A13 (reporting Canadian Foreign Minister as saying that
the resolution sets dangerous precedent of the "use of blackmail on peacekeeping to
achieve the purely self-interested objective of one of the council's permanent members").
See also William Orme, Dispute May End U.N. Role in Bosnia Diplomacy: U.S. Clashes
with Allies in a Failed Bid to Win Global Court Immunity, Then Vetoes an Extension of
Balkans Peacekeeping Mission, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2002, at Al.
196. See S.C. Res. 1497, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (2003).
197. Id., 7.
198. Cf. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 98(2) (providing: "The Court may not proceed
with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently
with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a
sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court").
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and commit themselves not to surrender U.S. nationals to the ICC.1 9  In
2002, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation threatening a variety of
measures against countries that cooperate with the ICC.2° In May 2002,
the Bush administration "filed for divorce from the court 2 1 and
repudiated the Clinton Administration's prior signing of the ICC Statute.
There are various arguments to America's opposition to the ICC.203 In
2002, Ronald Rumsfeld, Bush's Defense Secretary, summarized the
familiar but stale official position. He alleged the "lack of adequate checks
and balances on powers of the [Court's] prosecutors and judges; the
dilution of the U.N. Security Council's authority over international
criminal prosecutions; and the lack of an effective mechanism to prevent
politicized prosecutions of American servicemembers and officials. ' '20, For
many commentators, these reasons are both indefensible and absurd.
William Schabas, for example, has argued that, "these so-called
shortcomings are also features of the international tribunals to which the
United States has accorded enthusiastic support, from Nuremberg and
Tokyo to the more recent generation. '"2 5 It is interesting that no other
nation has raised the allegations that the U.S. is making against the ICC.2
6
The reason might be that not everyone shares the U.S. vision of freedom
and enlightenment, and those who did are backsliding, as images of
199. See, e.g., Eric Schwartz, The US Assault on World Criminal Court, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 1, 2002, at All; and Peter Slevin, U.S. Presses Allies on War Crimes Court; Aid
Wielded in Push for Immunity Pacts, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2002, at A12.
200. See American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116
Stat. 820 (2002) [hereinafter ASPA].
201. Kathleen Wilson, Ambassador Describes "New Diplomacy": Bush Appointee Also
Defends Decision on International Court, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Oct. 24, 2002, at B2.
202. See Press Release, Richard Boucher, International Criminal Court: Letter to UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan, (May 6, 2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm (reading a letter to U.N. Secretary General
Kofi Annan from Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
John R. Bolton). For a discussion of this action and its legal implications, see Edward T.
Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061 (2003).
203. See generally THE UNITED STATES AND THE ICC, supra note 110.
204. News Release, United States Department of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld Statement
on the ICC Treaty (May 6, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2002/bO5062002_bt233-02.html.
205. William Schabas, United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It's All
About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 701, 701 (2004).
206. See Remarks by Benjamin Ferencz, The International Criminal Court: The First Year
and Future Prospects, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 259 (2003) [hereinafter Ferencz,
Remarks].
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prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay circulate the globe
and supply fresh evidence of America's arrogance and depravity. 7
The U.S. claim to exceptionalism and its "holier-than-thou" attitude
in international affairs hang on an implied but false claim that it can bring
about universal peace through the implementation of its own values of
democracy and self-determination. Such a claim does violence to the
notion of equality before the law, which is ingrained in the basic principles
of sovereign equality and reciprocity in international law.2°' As Benjamin
Ferencz, Nuremberg's former Prosecutor argues, the notion that the law
should apply to everyone except the U.S. is "simply untenable. ' '2' Besides,
September 11, 2001 has shown that the U.S. is not immune from
adversities that afflict the rest of humanity and that "No State, no matter
how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to
today's threats., 21 Multilateralism, not unilateralism, remains for now, the
best policy in solving problems with global reach. As Harry Truman,
incidentally former U.S. President, wisely counseled in his speech to the
final plenary session of the founding conference of the U.N., "we all have
to recognize - no matter how great our strength - that we must deny
ourselves the licence to do always as we please.21'
Nevertheless, the exemption clause in Resolution 1593 must be seen
as a necessary sacrifice to end impunity in Sudan. There is reason for
optimism that this campaign will succeed, even if it takes one faltering step
after the other. As Andrew Boyd observed of the UNSC some years back,
207. See James Risen, G.L's are Accused of-Abusing Iraqi Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2004, at A15; Don Van Natta Jr., Questioning Terror Suspects in a Dark and Surreal World,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, § 1, at 1 (describing the atrocities in Guantdnamo. Bay prison,
including deprivation of sleep, food, and water; covering detainees' heads with hoods; and
forcing them to stand in physically stressful positions); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and
Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1681, 1682 (2005)
(stressing that what took place at Abu Ghraib "was not just a result of the depravity of a
few poorly trained reservists, but the upshot of a policy determined by intelligence officials
to have military police at the prison "set favorable conditions" (that was the euphemism)
for the interrogation of detainees"); and generally Fleur Johns, Guantdnamo Bay and the
Annihilation of the Exception, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 613 (2005).
208. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 289 (1998) ("The
sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of
nations.").
209. Ferencz, Remarks, supra note 206, at 259.
210. Cf. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 11, U.N. Doc.A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available
at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf [hereinafter A More Secure World].
211, Id. at 4.
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"the first time the tool is used there are almost bound to be complaints,
from one quarter or another, that it is bent sinisterly." '212
D. Should There Be Immunity for Impunity?
Immunity constitutes a procedural bar to the ordinary jurisdiction of a
court, and it is probable that President El-Bashir and his. officials will
invoke head-of-state and official immunities before the ICC. They will
seek to rely on customary law, which in the context of civil and criminal
jurisdictions, precludes the arraignment of foreign sovereigns or their
officials in foreign courts in actions relating to their official acts. This
doctrine is based on the maxim par in parem non habet imperium,2  which
is simply a specific application of the general principle of sovereign
equality. The justification for this doctrine is the need to promote
international equality, respect among nations, and freedom of action by
heads of state without fear of repercussions.214
Modern examples of the stymieing effect of immunities abound,
though mostly in relation to civil suits.2" In relation to U.S. practice, Saudi
Arabia v. Nelson21 6 provides one example; there, the plaintiff alleged that
Saudi government officers had tortured him but he was barred from suing
Saudi Arabia in a U.S. court on account of the government's foreign
sovereign status. The case Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran217 provides
an example of Canadian practice, relating to claims of torture barred by
Canadian State Immunity Act. However, in the recent UK case of Jones
212. ANDREW BOYD, FIFTEEN MEN ON A POWDER KEG: A HISTORY OF THE U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL 222 (1971).
213. "An equal has no power over an equal." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1673 (7th
ed. 1999).
214. See, e.g., Spanish Gov't v. Lamb~ge et Pujol, Cass., D. 1849, I, 5, 9 (finding that "a
government cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of another against its will, and that the
right of jurisdiction of one government over litigation arising from its own acts is a right
inherent to its sovereignty that another government cannot seize without impairing their
mutual relations"); Lakshman Marasinghe, The Modern Law of Sovereign Immunity, 54
MOD. L. REV. 664, 668-78 (1991).
215. See generally Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A
Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 741, 742 n.7 (2003).
216. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993). See also First American Corp. v. Sheikh
Sayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1119 (D.D.C. 1996); and Alicog v.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp. 379, 382 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd, 79 F.3d 1145 (5th
Cir. 1996).
217. Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 00-CV-201372 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. May 1,
2002).
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and Mitchell v. Saudi Interior Ministry and Others,2 8 the Court held that
acts of torture can never be assimilated to official state acts and do not,
therefore, attract the civil immunity of the state or the individual
perpetrators.
The good news is that international law has not yet passed the age of
childbearing. International criminal law, in particular, has deflated the
balloon of head-of-state immunity and no longer treats such a doctrine as
an article of blind faith, particularly when it relates to criminal conduct of
state officials. Major international law instruments and the jurisprudence
of national and international tribunals now make it clear that head-of-state
immunity is no longer a defense to prosecution for international crimes.
The Nuremberg trials first established a powerful precedent for holding
leaders accountable in a court of law who had committed grievous crimes
against humanity, including genocide. The Nuremberg Charter,219 which
authorized the trials, read, inter alia, "The official position of defendants,
whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments,
shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating
punishment.
' 220
The Nuremberg Principles,22' which grew out of the Nuremberg trials,
flatly rejects any immunity for impunity. It provides: "The fact that a
person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under
international [criminal] law acted as Head of State or responsible
Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under
international law. 22 The French Cour de Cassation referred to the
Nuremberg Principles as being "consistent with the general principles of
law recognised by the community of nations., 223 Both the Nuremberg trials
and Principles provided templates for "immunity" clauses in subsequent
instruments. The Draft Code of the International Law Commission
218. Jones and Mitchell v. Saudi Interior Ministry and Others, C.A. (Oct. 28, 2004),
available at www.redress.org/news/jones%20v%20saudi%20arabia.pdf.
219. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminal of
the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 58 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 280 (Aug. 8, 1945) [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
220. Id. art. 7.
221. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., pt.2, at 1144, U.N. Doc.
A/236 (1946) (affirming the principles of international law recognized by the Nuremberg
Charter); and Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, G.A. Res. 488, 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/CN.41SER.Al1950/Add.1 (1950) [hereinafter Nuremberg Principles].
222. See Nuremberg Principles, supra note 221, princ. III.
223. Klause Barbie case, Cass. (Ch. Crim.), Oct. 6, 1983, Receuil Dalloz Sirey, Jr. 113, 120
(1984) (on file with author).
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(ILC) 2 provides: "The official position of an individual who commits a
crime against the peace and security of mankind, even if he acted as head
of State or Government, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility or
mitigate punishment." '225 The Draft Code is not binding as a matter of
international law but it is an authoritative instrument, parts of which may
constitute evidence of customary international law.226
Then comes the ICC Statute, which unambiguously provides:
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a
government official shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and
of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.227
Both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes are similarly worded. 228 Although
the wording of the ICC Statute seems pretty clear, as does earlier other
instruments, some commentators insist that there are practical problems
regarded sitting heads of state, and that current international criminal
instruments provide no guidance. Claire De Than and Edwin Shorts, for
example, maintain that immunity limitations apply to former, as opposed
to sitting, heads of states. Their reasoning is that "there is not only a great
deal of practical difficulty in indicting [a sitting head of state] ... for an
international crime, but also a legal barrier in the form of his technical
224. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind 1996
[hereinafter Draft Code], in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Forty-Eighth Session: 6 May - 26 July 1996, G.A. Res. 51/160, 51 U.N. GAOR 51st Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, at 93-104, 83, U.N. Doc. A/51/49 (1996) [hereinafter Report of ILC 1996].
225. Id. art. 7.
226. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, T 227 (Dec. 10, 1998) (holding that, at
the very least, the Draft Code may "be indicative of the legal views of eminently qualified
publicists representing the major legal systems of the world") [hereinafter Furundzija].
227. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 27(1). See also id. art. 27(2) ("Immunities or
special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction
over such a person").
228. See ICTY Statute, supra note 55, art. 7(2) ("The official position of any accused
person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official,
shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment"); and
ICTR Statute, supra note 56, art. 6(2) (similarly worded).
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identification with his State., 229 However, they add that a blanket
application "contains much merit as a practical step in addressing the
visible trend toward impunity for gross human rights violations and serious
international crimes that pervaded the twentieth century, and shows no
real sign of stopping.
230
Municipal judicial tribunals also affirm individual criminal
responsibility for international crimes, regardless of the identity of the
suspect. In the much-debated United States v. Noriega,231 the U.S. arrested
General Manuel Noriega, the de facto leader of Panama, in 1990 and
charged him in a US court, inter alia, for engaging in a criminal enterprise
in violation of U.S. racketeering and drug laws. Noriega's charge presented
the court with "several issues of first impression, 232 one of which was the
traditional immunity and jurisdiction defenses, defenses which the court
refused to uphold. The Court, however, made clear that certain criminal
activities, such as the trafficking of narcotics, would not be considered an
official act.
Immunity issues resurfaced again in the Pinochet case,233 which was
particularly unique, because it was the first time a former head of state was
arrested for crimes against humanity, and the first time that an English
court removed the immunity from a Head of State for international crimes.
One of the issues of consideration was whether Pinochet continued to
enjoy immunity for acts committed during his tenure as head of state.
Despite his initial victory, the House of Lords, on March 24, 1999, ruled
that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity for violations of international
229. CLAIRE DE THAN & EDWIN SHORTS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 52-53 (London Sweet & Maxwell 2003) [hereinafter DE THAN & SHORTS]; Cf.
Bantekas, supra note 156, at 28 (arguing for exceptions in the case of "acts, even abhorrent
criminal acts, committed by a serving Head of State, serving Government members and
serving Heads of diplomatic missions and their families" and that "[tihis type of immunity is
called ratione personae and is granted for the benefit of the particular individual on
account of his or her office").
230. DE THAN & SHORTS, supra note 229, at 53.
231. See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990), affd, 117 F.3d 1206
(11th Cir. 1997). See also Separation of Powers-Head of State Immunity-Eleventh Circuit
Holds that the Executive Branch's Capture of Noriega Exempts Him from Head of State
Immunity-United States v. Noriega, 117 E3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997), 111 HARV. L. REv. 849,
849 (1998) [hereinafter Separation of Powers].
232. Adam Isaac Hasson, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity on Trial:
Noriega, Pinochet, and Milosevic-Trends in Political Accountability and Transnational
Criminal Law, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 125,126 (2002).
233. See generally Regina v. Bartle, Ex parte Pinochet, 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L. 1998)
[hereinafter Pinochet 1]; and Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet, 2 W.L.R.
827 (H.L. 1999) [hereinafter Pinochet 2].
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criminal law, or serious human rights violations, since such allegations
could not be considered official acts under principles of immunity."M Like
the Nuremberg trials, the Noriega and Pinochet decisions have set
powerful precedents for contemporary international tribunals seeking to
prosecute foreign leaders for human rights violations, and other violations
of international and domestic law.235
The emergent norm that denies immunity to any individual charged
for grave crimes, in whatever capacity they were committed, is a concrete
achievement of contemporary international law. Some commentators
sustain this norm on the distinction between official and private acts,
meaning that criminal acts of state officials are not regarded as acts of
states.236 Other scholars criticize this reasoning as "unsound and even
preposterous from the strictly legal viewpoint., 237 They offer an alternative
basis, which sustains the denial on peremptory norms, such as those
protecting human rights. These norms "prevail over 'simple' customary
rules, such as that granting state immunity; [and] no legal effects can be
therefore attached to acts which are null and void because of their
inconsistency with peremptory norms. 238 In support of this latter
234. See id. See also Ruth Wedgwood, Augusto Pinochet and International Law, 46
MCGILL L.J. 241 (2000) (exploring the interplay between historicized law and normative
standards of human rights law by considering how the House of Lords dealt with the
question of General Pinochet's immunity); Ruth Wedgwood, 40th Anniversary Perspective:
International Criminal Law and Augusto Pinochet, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 829, 831 (2000); and
Michael Byers, The Law and Politics of the Pinochet Case, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
415,415-16 (2000).
235. Slobodan Milosevic, former President of Yugoslavia, is currently standing trial
before the ICTY for war crimes and crimes against humanity. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic,
Trial Chamber, Indictment No. IT-02-54 (pending). See also William Miller, Slobodan
Milosevic's Prosecution by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A
Harbinger of Things to Come for International Criminal Justice, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 553, 554-55 (2000).
236. See, e.g., A. Bianchi, Denying State Immunity to Violators of Human Rights, 46 AUST.
J. PuB. & INT'L L. 195, 227 (1993/94) (recalling the distinction between 'official' and
'unofficial' public acts made by some US courts, starting with the 1980 Filartiga v. Pefia
Irala case, and extending it to the field of state immunity, "by way of analogy.").
237. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for
International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 E.J.I.L. 853, 869
(2002). See also Steffen Wirth, Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ's Judgment in the
Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EURO. J. INT'L. L. 877, 890 (2002) (arguing that the distinction is
"not the most satisfactory method of dealing with the problem"); J. Wouters, The Judgment
of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant Case: Some Critical Remarks, 16
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 253, 262 (2003).
238. Andrea Gattini, War Crimes and State Immunity in the Ferrini Decision, 3 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 224, 234-35 (2005).
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argument, one could refer to the AU Act, enshrining respect for the
sanctity of human life, and condemnation and rejection of impunity as one
of the normative principles that should guide the AU in the conduct of
international relations.239
Whatever might be the legal basis for this normative shift, the general
opinion seems to be that the time for flogging dead paradigms is past.
Classic, Westphalian, international law "principles were an expression of
the conviction that domestic rulers were less likely to be arbitrary than
crusading foreign armies bent on conversion. '240 Parts of the mental
furniture of that era were concepts of sovereignty, immunity, and non-
interference in the internal affairs of states. In the modern era, however,
these principles have become principal obstacles to the universal rule of
law, justice, and human rights. Most modern governments have become
predators that must be contained in order to advance individual freedoms.
The emergent universal rule of law demands that there should be no
outside-of-law and that everyone, everywhere, should be accountable for
his or her deeds, regardless of position.
The applicability of this new paradigm still has to be worked out,
particularly as it affects sitting heads-of-state; but in principle, there is no
reason to be defensive on this shift. A society has a right to limit itself and
an individual is only a part of the international society, no matter how
highly placed, and a part cannot be greater than the whole. African or
other tyrants cannot continue to use state apparatus to slaughter the very
citizens they were supposed to protect, and then hide under the fagade of
immunity. Granting immunity to sitting heads-of-state for international
crimes they commit represents the ultimate hypocrisy, and makes
nonsense of any modest advances that international (human rights) law
has made in the last few decades. What such immunity means is that while
victims of horrifying atrocities struggle to put their suffering behind them,
their perpetrators are left under the panoply of power undisturbed to
commit further atrocities and eventually retire to write their 'memoirs.'
Upholding such immunity "mock[s] the dead and make[s] cynics of the
living."2" ' It shamefully vindicates the ancient philosopher, Anacharsis,
who maintained that laws were like cobwebs, strong enough to detain only
the weak, but too weak to hold the strong. It could embolden persons who
in the future desire to take a course of conduct that is in deliberate
violation of international criminal law. It could lead to desperate
239. See AU Act, supra note 59, art. 4(o).
240. KISSINGER, supra note 18, at 21.
241. ROBERT H. JACKSON, TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS: REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON
TO THE PRESIDENT, DEP'T. OF STATE 3 (1945).
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consolidations of power by despots, as shelters from prosecutions for
atrocities they commit.
The ICC must not allow President El-Bashir and his officials to run
away from justice with the Darfur crimes. Even if Darfur is a slip, it is at
least a case of failed security for which El-Bashir should be held
accountable. His officials, including the regional administrative officials in
Darfur, military commanders, and militia leaders, should also be
investigated, either as a matter of individual criminal responsibility or
command responsibility.242 History has shown that the involvement of
highly placed functionaries or officials of states makes the commission of
most international crimes possible; it is great men, potential saints, not
little men, who become merciless fanatics. The Janjaweed militia leaders
must not be allowed to hide behind the faqade of state or superior orders
as justification for their heinous atrocities in Darfur, since they were under
no legal obligation to obey such orders, and they cannot pretend not to
know that such orders were unlawful.243 There comes a point when a man
must refuse to answer to his leader if he is also to answer to his own
conscience. In any event, an order on anyone to commit genocide or
crimes against humanity is "manifestly unlawful.
2
"
E. The Victim Trust Fund
One of the defects in traditional criminal justice systems has been its
focus on the offender and its neglect of the offended. The ICTY and ICTR
were, for example, established essentially for rectificatory justice, that is, to
deal "with injustice in terms of direct physical violence suffered by people
during conflict., 25 The problem with rectificatory or retributive justice has
been its ex post facto nature, which does not always bring real healing to
victims of grave crimes. A limited ad hoc court, created after the event, "is
hardly the best way to ensure universal justice."24
Things are different now, as emerging criminal norms now require
states to develop reparation programs for common post-conflict
challenges, including the loss of property by displaced persons and
refugees. Indeed, states are increasingly being obliged, in the face of
242. See Entrenching Impunity, supra note 27, at 1.
243. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 33(1). See generally CRIMES OF WAR: A LEGAL,
POLITICAL-DOCUMENTARY, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
LEADERS, CITIZENS, AND SOLDIERS FOR CRIMINAL ACTS IN WARS (Richard A. Falk,
Gabriel Kolko & Robert Jay Lifton 1971).
244. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 33(2).
245. RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS OF WAR 7
(Blackwell Publishers, Inc. 2002).
246. Ferencz, Address, supra note 1, at T 5.
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widespread human rights violations, to act not only against perpetrators,
but also on behalf of victims through the provision of reparations.247 In
post-conflict situations and in the realm of international criminal law, both
the demands of justice and the dictates of peace require that something
should be done to compensate victims. The ICC Statute meets this demand
by balancing retributive and restorative justice, enabling the ICC not only
to hold individuals accountable for egregious crimes, but also to provide
restitution for victims of such crimes from the pockets of the criminal.248 In
honoring the victims' right to benefit from remedies and reparation, "the
international community keeps faith and human solidarity with victims,
survivors and future human generations, and reaffirms the international
legal principles of accountability, justice and the rule of law." '249 This
development reflects, in Hans Holthuis's apt words, "a shift of emphasis
from the highly legal-technical to the utmost practical.""25
As for Darfur, the UNCI had recommended that the UNSC should
establish a Compensation Commission under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter. The 15-member Commission was to sit in Darfur-the place
where the crimes were committed. The UNCI suggested five Chambers,
each comprising three members and dealing with different categories of
victims, including victims of rape.51 Generally, the establishment of such a
Commission could be justified on moral, if not on legal, grounds; but there
are voices of dissent!252 Regrettably, Resolution 1593 ignored this vital
issue but merely recalled Articles 75 and 79 of the ICC Statute and
247. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 190, at 54.
248. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, pmbl. See also id. art. 75(2) ("The Court may make an
order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect
of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation").
249. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Special Rapporteur, The Right to Restitution, Compensation
and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms - Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, M. Cherif Bassiouni, submitted in
accordance with Resolution 1999/33, Jan. 18, 2000, pmbl., E/CN.4/2000/62 available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.2004.NG0.125.En?Opend
ocument (last visited Oct. 26, 2005).
250. Hans Holthuis, Address by the Registrar of the ICTY to the Plenary of the
Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court during its Eighth Session
(Oct. 1, 2001), available at www.iccnow.org/html/ICTY.html; also available at
http://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=indOllO&L=justwatch-I&D=0&P=5461&F-P
(last visited Oct. 27, 2005).
251. See generally UNCI Report, supra note 27, at 1$ 570, 590-603.
252. Contra. Christian Tomuschat, Darfur-Compensation for the Victims, 3 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 579 (2005) (arguing that there is no customary international rule governing
individual reparation claims and that no general international forum for the assertion of
such claims has come into being).
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encouraged "States to contribute to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims. '253
With this abdication of responsibility by the UNSC, the ICC now carries
the burden of ordering reparations and compensations for victims of the
Darfur mayhem. The ICC Statute empowers the Court to "establish
principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation." '254 Reparations issues in the
context of transitional justice naturally raise questions of "who," ".how,"
and "what." Who, for example, should be included among victims to be
compensated? How much compensation should be awarded or rewarded?
What kinds of harm should be covered, and how should it be quantified?
How are the different kinds of harm to be compared and compensated and
how should the compensation be distributed?
Generally, the ICC is permitted to determine the scope and extent of
any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of victims, and to state the
principles on which it is acting.255 The ICC Rules of Procedure and
Evidence defines "victims" as "natural persons who have suffered harm as
a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court." '256 However, a careful reading of the ICC Statute itself shows that
"victims" are broadly defined. They include child soldiers, that is, minors
pressed into military service and suffering great ordeals by being forced
into front line service. (Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of
15 into the national armed forces, or using them to participate actively in
hostilities itself constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute). 257 They
include rape victims needing help, not just for the material loss in a war,
but also for trauma counseling.25 The ICC Rules also "include
organizations or institutions that have sustained direct harms to any of
their property which is dedicated to religion, education, art, or science or
charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospital and other
places and objects for humanitarian purposes. ' 211
253. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 3, $ 3.
254. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 75(1).
255. Id.
256. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, R. 85(a), available at
http://www.campusdenhaag.n/documenten/bonneau.doc (last visited Oct. 27, 2005)
[hereinafter ICC Rules].
257. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 8(2)(xxvi).
258. See, e.g., id. art. 43(6) (requiring the Registrar to set up "a Victims and Witnesses
Unit," which "shall include staff with expertise in trauma, including trauma related to
crimes of sexual violence"). See also id. art. 54(1)(b) (on the duties and powers of the
Prosecutor with respect to investigation).
259. ICC Rules, supra note 256, R. 85(b).
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In pursuance of the above provisions, read in conjunction with Article
79 of the Statute, 26 the ICC has established a Victims Trust Fund (VTF).
Its Registry administers the VTF with supervision by an independent
Board of Directors.261 The aim of the VTF is to channel money to victims,
sometimes from monies that the ICC will order an offender to pay as
compensation. The funds may be allocated either to individuals, or to a
collectivity; payments may be made directly to victims or to other bodies,
such as aid organizations. Where a convict does not have the necessary
funds to pay the compensation imposed, the Court will seek external
sources, such as grants from governments, international organizations and
individuals.
Trials at the ICC will necessarily involve victims who have often been
severely damaged, given the nature of the Court's mandate. Providing
justice to these victims is important, but a component of that justice must
include the provision of help and compensation to enable them to rebuild
lives often shattered by war. In Darfur, more than 1.65 million persons
have been internally displaced, with more than 200,000 refugees in
neighboring Chad. There has also been large-scale destruction of villages
throughout the region's three states.62 There can be no justice for such
people unless there is a conscious effort by the international community to
rebuild broken lives and homes. Even the GoS must, if it is to regain its
legitimacy and credibility, put in place programs to provide reparations to
Darfur victims for harms suffered, including restitution of legal rights (or
just compensation where this cannot be done) and official apologies. Such
concrete steps will not only complement contributions by the ICC, but
they will significantly promote reconciliation and restore confidence in the
State.263 Authority must be exercised with humility if obedience is to be
accepted with delight.
F. Cooperation with the ICC
A literal reading of Resolution 1593 gives the impression that only the
GoS and other parties to the Darfur conflict are under legal obligation to
"cooperate fully with and provide necessary assistance to the Court and
the Prosecutor."2'6 Such an interpretation, however, does violence to
260. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 79(1) (providing for the establishment of a Trust
Fund "for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court and [of the
families of such victims]").
261. The ICC Statute provides that "[tihe Trust Fund shall be managed according to
criteria to be determined by the Assembly of States Parties." Id. art. 79(3).
262. See UNCI Report, supra note 27, at 3.
263. Cf. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 190, at 54.
264. S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 3, 2.
20051
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
general principles of international law. Obviously, State Parties have the
primary obligation to cooperate, based on the sacred principle, pacta sunct
servanda, which by interpretation means: "Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.""26
From a realistic point of view, states do not often implement treaties
merely out of respect for the pacta sunct servanda rule, which explains why
recent treaties contain specific obligations on states to cooperate in order
to facilitate compliance.
The ICC Statute first permits the Court to request cooperation from
States Parties2 and to seek assistance from non-States Parties,"' and even
inter-governmental organizations.2" States Parties are expected to
cooperate fully with the Court,6 including surrendering accused persons
within their territories27 and providing other forms of assistance.27 ' This
may entail implementing necessary legislation for the executing of
warrants and requests of the ICC, especially as existing domestic laws
might not have envisaged obligations under the ICC Statute. This is an
obligation of conduct (French obligation de conduite), that is, obligation
requiring States to perform a specifically determined action.2"
The obligation to cooperate with the ICC in respect of Darfur does
not rest only on the ICC Statute; it also has, as its legal basis, the U.N.
Charter, especially for non-States Parties to the Statute. Since Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter forms the basis of Resolution 1593, it is conceivable to
argue that the resolution creates binding obligations on all States to take
whatever steps required for their implementations. 73 Some commentators
have argued that, with respect to Darfur, paragraph 2 of Resolution 1593
265. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (May 23,
1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
266. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 87(1); see also id. art. 89.
267. See id. art. 87(5).
268. See id. art. 87(6).
269. See id. art. 86.
270. See id. art. 89.
271. See id. art. 93.
272. See The Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Decision on the Defence Motion Filed Pursuant to
Rule 64), 8, Case IT-95-14/1 (Apr. 3, 1996) [hereinafter Blaskic Defence Motion].
273. Cf. U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 25 (wherein all Members States of the UN have
agreed to accept and carry out decisions of the UNSC under the Charter). The Council's
voting rules require that at least 9 of the 15 members must vote in favor of an action
potentially binding all members of the U.N. See id. art. 27(3) ("Decisions of the Security
Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members
including the concurring votes of the permanent members ..."). 11 members voted in
favor of Resolution 1593.
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excludes the possibility of extending the obligation to cooperate to all states.274
The present writer rejects this interpretation and submits that Resolution
1593's call on the GoS and all other parties to the Darfur crisis to
cooperate fully with the Prosecutor and the ICC applies with equal force
to all Member States of the U.N., based on the above analysis.275
One implication arising from this conclusion is that, though both the
ICC Statute and the U.N. Charter provide bases for obligations to
cooperate with the ICC, such an obligation is probably stronger if it arises
from a Chapter VII decision. The reason is because the ICC Statute is
request and horizontally based, with the ICC and States being on an equal
footing, based on the principle of complimentarity.276 However, it is
possible to argue that the relationship between the ICC and states is
asymmetrical and vertical, given the power of the ICC to overrule national
systems where it determines, for example, that they are unwilling or unable
to prosecute. As for the U.N. Charter, the relationship between the UNSC
and Member States is clearly vertical, meaning that norms arising from
Chapter VII are higher in hierarchy to treaty-based norms, 7 though such
norms are not immune from review according to applicable legal
principles.27 Therefore, in relation to Resolution 1593, an order by the ICC
Trial Chamber to any U.N. Member State to surrender or transfer persons
to the custody of the Court will be considered as the application of an
enforcement measure under Chapter VII. In such a situation, a State
becomes an agent of the UNSC to execute the ICC order.
In practice, the ICC does not have a police force-unlike national
jurisdictions; thus, it will rely upon the assistance of the GoS and other
entities at the different stages of its proceedings, from the arrest of
suspects to the enforcement of the sentences of the convicted.2 " The most
immediate need will arise in relation to the arrests of indicted persons by
274. See Condorelli & Ciampi, supra note 113, at 593 (admitting, in principle, that "one of
the implications of a [UN]SC referral is that all state are automatically put under an
international obligation to comply with requests for cooperation by the Court," id.).
275. Cf Annalisa Ciampi, The Obligation to Cooperate, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE, supra note 83, 1607, 1611.
276. See KRISTINA MOSKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONSENT,
COMPLEMTARITY AND COOPERATION 9 (2000); cf. Jones & Powles, supra note 161, at 837.
277. See Kirgis Jr., supra note 68, at 506; and generally Paul Szasz, The Security Council
Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 901 (2002).
278. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the
Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 16 EURO. J.
INT'L. L. 59, 60 (2005) (citing Judge Jennings, in [1998] ICJ REP. 110).
279. See Philippe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court: A New and Necessary
Institution Meriting Continued International Support, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 292, 306
(2005).
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States. Cooperation will also be required in relation to access to victims
and witnesses by the Prosecutor and vice-versa. A major challenge-in
view of the vested interest of the GoS-will be how to ensure free
movements of investigators, including access to the public information if
they desire. Given the unpredictable political and security climate, and the
need for protective measures and security arrangements for the majority of
witnesses testifying before the Court, the GoS must be told clearly that it
has the primary responsibility to guarantee security for investigators,
victims and witnesses. The victims and witnesses, in particular, must be
protected from possible reprisals.
Going by past antecedents, Sudan is unlikely to cooperate fully with
the ICC over Darfur, if at all; but a refusal to cooperate will greatly
undermine the authority of the Court. The UNSC should assist in
equipping and mobilizing the AMIS or, hopefully, the U.N. peacekeeping
force, in order to serve as an effective counterpoise to the forces in Sudan,
and in particular to work with the ICC Prosecutor to effect arrests of
indictees if necessary. The UNSC and AU will need to dangle both carrots
and sticks to get the GoS to cooperate with the ICC. For example, the
UNSC should be prepared to implement the sanctions resolution fully-
the resolution seems to be in abeyance at the moment-should the GoS
treat the ICC with contempt. Sanctions do not produce their intended
effect when they are weakly enforced, often due to the strategic interests
of powerful states.
The international community must be clear that the time for wishful
thinking and soft diplomacy in Sudan is over. Darfur is now a test of wills
and the international community must find ways to quarantine and
ultimately destroy the virus of impunity, which could become an epidemic
if left untreated. It must speak with one voice and should be prepared to
act tough on several aspects of the referral, otherwise the credibility of the
ICC as an international criminal institution will be severely damaged.
G. Funding the Darfur Prosecution
Related to the question of cooperation is the specific issue of funding
the Darfur referral, which is examined here separately not only because
"money is a defence, ' 28 but more especially for the tenor of Resolution
1593. The resolution frees the U.N. from any financial obligation towards
the Darfur prosecution. It provides:
[N]one of the expenses incurred in connection with the
referral including expenses related to investigations or
280. Ecclesiastes 7:12 (King James).
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prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne
by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by
the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish
to contribute voluntarily.
This provision is clearly at variance with the ICC Statute and also with
the decision to refer. The issue of funding the ICC, of course, was hotly
debated at the preparatory meetings leading to the adoption of the Statute,
with France proposing that funding for the Court should be determined by
the nature of relationship between the Court and the U.N. and suggesting
assessed contributions by Member States.282 The final provision was a
synthesis from this dialectic. Under the ICC Statute, the primary
responsibility for financing the Court and its subsidiary bodies rests on
States Parties to the Statute and the U.N., the latter particularly in the case
of UNSC referral.283 Institutions, individuals, and other entities may also
make voluntary contributions to the Court, as a secondary obligation.
When received, the Court must utilize such contributions in accordance
with the relevant criteria laid down by the Assembly of States Parties.28
Clearly, the ICC was established via a multilateral treaty because of
its implications for the type and content of the relationship between the
Court and the U.N., including the need to ensure the Court's "financial
and administrative viability."285 In October 2004, the two institutions
further solemnized their financial relationship by signing the Negotiated
Relationship Agreement,2 6 which inter alia, provided that "the conditions
under which any funds may be provided to the Court by a decision of the
General. Assembly of the [U.N.] pursuant to Article 115 of the Statute
shall be subject to separate arrangements. 87 Demanding that the U.N.
281. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 3, 7.
282. See France's proposal submitted to the March 1998 Session of the Preparatory
Committee, A/AC.249/1998/L.12, cited in S. Rama Rao, Financing the Court, Assembly of
States Parties and the Preparatory Committee, in THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE,
supra note 95, at 399, 403.
283. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 115.
284. See id. art. 116.
285. Ad Hoc Committee, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp No. 22, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/50122
(1995) (stating also that a close relationship between the Court and the UN was considered
to be "an essential condition of the universality and moral authority of the new
institution").
286. Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the UN, Oct. 4, 2004,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-ReslEnglish.pdf [hereinafter
Negotiated Relationship Agreement].
287. Id. art. 13.
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fund the ICC, especially for UNSC referrals, is clearly logical, since
benefits and burdens go together. The UNSC cannot enjoy the benefit of
prescribing norms without the corresponding burden of providing
resources to facilitate the implementation of such norms.
Like the exemption of certain persons from prosecution, the exclusion
of the U.N. from expenses on the Darfur trial is one more manifestation of
real politick at the U.N. and of the U.S. aggression against the ICC. As
early as December 1997, at the Sixth Preparatory Committee Meeting, the
U.S. solely opposed suggestions that the ICC should be funded from the
regular budget of the U.N.2 8 Its argument was, and is, that countries
opposed to the Court have no obligation to finance its expenses; and being
a major contributor to the U.N., the U.S. has threatened to withhold its
funds or to take other measures if this "principle" is retrenched." 9 Clearly,
the policy of the U.S. is to turn every issue at the UNSC into a show of
strength; its unofficial leadership has become official headship, "where
decisions for the group are arrived at unilaterally by a leader whose
overweening power ensures that subordinates will have few other options
than to comply."29° Such peremptory and domineering, if not imperial,
mindset continues to prevent the expression of clear and robust signals
from the UNSC and undermines the legitimacy of the U.N. policing
mechanism. Not surprisingly, calls for UNSC reforms and the opening up
of its proceedings to engender a sense of greater participation by U.N.
members are growing louder with each passing day. 91 The paucity of
representation from the broad U.N. membership has also diminished
support for UNSC decisions."
The present writer insists that the UNSC's stance on ICC funding is
indefensible and unsustainable, since Resolution 1593 is a Chapter VII
measure, which not only binds all Member States of the U.N.-including
288. See generally Establishment of an International Criminal Court: Report of the 6th
Committee, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/52/651; G.A. Res. 52/160, U.N. GAOR
52nd Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/52/160 [hereinafter Report of the 6th Committee].
289. See UNSC Press Release 8351, supra note 39 (reporting US representative to the
UNSC after Resolution 1593 vote).
290. Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott & Kim Nossal, Bound to Follow? Leadership and
Fellowship in the Gulf Conflict, 106 POL. SCL 0. 391, 407 (1991).
291. See UNSC Press Release 8351, supra note 39 (reporting Lauro Bajo, representative
of Philippines at the UNSC).
292. A More Secure World, supra note 210, at 80 (urging the UN to bring into the
decision-making process of the UNSC "countries more representative of the broader
membership, especially of the developing world"). See also David D. Caron, The
Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552, 555
(1993) (calling, inter alia, for a reform of the veto and increase in membership of the
UNSC).
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the U.N. itself-but has to be interpreted in the light of the ICC Statute
relating to funding of the Court. It is rash for the UNSC to exempt the
U.N. from financial obligations for the Darfur prosecution before the
Court's financial estimate is even known. It will probably take some
months for the Court to arrive at a realistic budget, given the complexities
of the Darfur conflict. A realistic approach would be for the UNSC to wait
and look for possible areas of intervention. The ICC needs the U.N. to
improve the Court's finances, particularly as contributions by States
Parties do not often come when due. The ICC might have the capacity, in
human terms, but it does not have the "funding necessary to ensure swift
and effective prosecution" of Darfur crimes, contrary to Ellen Margrethe
Loj's claims.293 A 2005 review of the financial situation of the Court shows
that "only 50 percent of contributions had been received", as at April 5,
2005." Furthermore, only 21 States Parties to the Rome Statute have paid
their 2005 contributions in full. This leaves 33,472,000 outstanding for
2005.25 A total of 4,683,966 was outstanding for 2004, and 1,152,105 for
2002-2003, financial periods. 29 6 11 States Parties have not made any
payment for any financial period!
291
The complexities that emerge from the Uganda and DRC deferrals,
coupled with the additional responsibilities entailed in the Darfur referral,
constitute a very challenging agenda for the ICC. The unlikelihood of
disposing cases currently under investigations complicates these
challenges. When trial commences, the Court will be constrained to
provide legal aid for indigent accused persons2 9 to ensure respect for the
293. UNSC Press Release 8351, supra note 39 (reporting Danish representative to the
UNSC).
294. ICC, Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance on the Work of its Fourth
Session, 4th Sess., at 5, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/4/2 available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-4-2-English.pdf (April 15, 2005) [hereinafter
Budget & Finance Report].
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. See id. at 5. Such defaulting members could lose their voting rights under the ICC
Statute. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 112(8) ("A State Party which is in arrears in the
payment of its financial contributions towards the costs of the Court shall have no vote in
the Assembly and in the Bureau if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount
of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The Assembly may,
nevertheless, permit such a State Party to vote in the Assembly and in the Bureau if it is
satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the State Party.")
Id.
298. For a report of the ICC on the principles and criteria for the determination of
indigence for the purposes of legal aid, see ICC, ICC report on the principles and criteria for
the determination of indigence for the purposes of legal aid, 4th Sess. ICC Doc. ICC-
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principle of equality of arms.2 This requires money, besides the
considerable risk that legal aid entails. Experience with ad hoc tribunals
has shown that the administration of legal aid could result in unreasonably
high costs and abuses by some defense counsel and defendants, as some
counsel could prolong proceedings for financial gain, particularly where
rigorous controls are lacking.3"
These are some of the reasons why the U.N. cannot stand idly by and
leave the ICC to sort out the Darfur situation alone. Of course, the
primary responsibility for funding the Court and its activities lies with its
States Parties; but the UNSC has a particular role to play in this regard, as
the Secretary-General keenly observed.3"1 It is good for the UNSC to
condemn the Darfur atrocities, as it has done in numerous resolutions, but
it is better if the body also offers both direct and indirect assistance to the
ICC in addressing some cost-related problems that will inevitably ensue
from the referral. The UNSC should mandate relevant U.N. organs and
agencies to source funds for the Court, considering the Court's infancy and
its huge financial needs. As Philippe Kirsch argues, "[t]he United Nations
has extensive resources which could aid investigations or prosecutions as
well as the implementation of Court decisions."3 2
The ICC is a newborn baby, born more or less out of nothing. It is
temporarily located in a building known as "de Arc," which the
Government of Netherlands offered to the Court free of rent for ten years.
This gesture is the equivalent to a Dutch contribution of 33 million, plus
10 million for the interior layout and design of the courtroom and other
parts of the building.3 3 Other members of the international community
must help and nurture the Court to grow. As the Secretary-General
pleaded: "It is now crucial that the international community ensures that
this nascent institution has the resources, capacities, information and
ASP/4/CBF.1/2. The ICC Budget and Finance Committee, while receiving considering this
report, noted that proposed system for determining indigence is based on principles of
objectivity, flexibility and simplicity, taking into took into account the obligations of the
person requesting legal assistance to his or her dependants. See Budget & Finance Report,
supra note 294, at 14 (also recommending that "the determination of indigence should be
conducted in an objective manner on the basis of a full examination of each applicant's
financial assets and income").
299. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 55(2)(c) (providing for the right to free legal
assistance for indigent accused during an investigations, in any case where the interest of
justice so require).
300. See Budget & Finance Report, supra note 294, at 14.
301. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 190, at 16.
302. Kirsch, supra note 279, at 306.
303. See Ernst Hirsch Ballin, The Responsibilities of the Host State, 97 ASIL PROC. 260,
262 (2003).
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support it needs to investigate, prosecute and bring to trial those who bear
the greatest responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide[.]"3" Canada's voluntary contribution of $500,000 towards the
Darfur investigation is commendable;. 5 but more is urgently needed.
V. CONCLUSION
Now that the ICC and its Prosecutor have received clear mandates
from the UNSC to investigate, prosecute, and punish crimes committed in
Darfur, they must respond swiftly and assume the responsibilities entailed
therein. It is obviously difficult for a judicial tribunal constituted in the
middle of a conflict to undertake an effective investigation and
apprehension of offenders. This is the challenge facing the ICC and its
Prosecutor in Sudan, compounded by the fact that those with the
monopoly of force are the ones committing the crimes in Darfur.
Apparently, the UNSC was not reasoning along this line when it adopted
Resolution 1593; rather, it saw the ICC referral as a halfway measure from
the humanitarian military intervention (HMI) that could have stopped
actual atrocities in Darfur before setting the mechanism for accountability
in motion."
The ICC will be expected to balance competing interests in Sudan-
those of the victim population, the affected state and the majority states.3"
It should be prepared to "face serious challenges that will question its
independence from political institutions, its legitimacy as an authentic
interpreter of international norms, and its accountability to the states that
created it and whose nationals face prosecution within its courtrooms."'
To meet these challenges, the Court must rigorously assert its
independence and must not allow itself to be manipulated by power
politics. In this difficult task of navigating between power and justice, the
ICC has a lot to gain from the acquis of past and existing ad hoc tribunals.
304. Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, supra note 190, at J 16.
305. See ICC Takes Key Step to Bring Justice to Darfur, supra note 176.
306. For the humanitarian argument, see Nsongurua J. Udombana, When Neutrality Is a
Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan, 27 HuM. RTs.
Q. 1149 (2005) (arguing that the grave and continuing crimes committed in Darfur justify
humanitarian military intervention, given the failure of diplomacy to prize the GoS into
halting the mayhem, and denouncing the apparent neutral posturing by the international
community, stressing that such neutrality helps the killers and not the victims).
307. See generally Morris, supra note 88, at 195 (discussing the need for delineation of
policies to govern the application of complementarity and balance the prioritization of
interests under the ICC Statute).
308. Danner, supra note 149, at 511.
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The ICTY and ICTR, in particular, have laid a blueprint for international
criminal justice-"an international criminal forum applying rules of
international law, holding persons individually responsible for crimes
against humanity and war crimes, after allowing them a fair trial. ,
301
Assuringly, the ICC Prosecutor has promised that "[t]he investigation
will be impartial and independent, focusing on the individuals who bear
the greatest criminal responsibility for crimes committed in Darfur. ' ,31' The
Court, on its part, must ensure respect for the rights of the accused. It must
scrupulously observe due process and interpret and apply the law in ways
that are consistent with internationally recognized human rights, including
requirements of fairness and impartiality.31' In case of ambiguity in the
definition of a particular crime under the Statute, the Court must construe
it in favor of the person being investigated, prosecuted, or convicted. It is
true that judges are humans and subject to the influence of their
environment, but the ICC judges must rise above influences of popular
feeling and prejudice. The ability of the Court to force states and non-state
entities to respect and comply with its decisions depends on the general
perception of the legitimacy and fairness of its process.312
If the ICC does well with the Darfur case, it will undercut basic
arguments against its existence, change the political situation more
favorable to its work, provide a whole range of arguments to use in its
defense, and a potentially new audience of which to make them. These
ends make it urgent for the international community to help the ICC in
bringing justice to both victims and perpetrators of the Darfur mayhem.
All stakeholders in the crisis-the UN, the AU, States Parties to the Rome
Statute, the GoS, and relevant segments of the civil society-should take
ownership of the ICC and provide assistance to it when it desires and
requires it. They should mobilize resources for a sustainable investment to
enable the Court make a genuine leap, rather than a token gesture,
towards international justice. The cause of justice in Sudan is worth
sacrificing for, due to a variety of reasons. One reason is that the persistent
and persisting crisis in Sudan poses grave challenges to neighboring states,
309. BOOTH, supra note 115, at 159 (noting further that the jurisprudence of these
tribunals, especially "the progressive view that crimes against humanity could be committed
in peace time, and the decision that war crimes could be committed during an internal
armed conflict-contributed to the debates in Rome and eventually came to be reflected in
the Rome Statute").
310. Prosecutor Opens Investigation, supra note 154.
311. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 68(1).
312. See THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 316-17
(1995) (examining fairness in the context of the ICJ).
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regional stability, and international peace and security.13 Another reason is
that the ordinary people of Darfur will have no confidence in their
reconstituted society unless justice is re-established.3"4 Justice, not power, is
the ultimate aphrodisiac.
313. Cf Jeremy D. Rosner, Is Chaos America's Real Enemy?, WASH. POST, Aug. 14,
1994, at C-1 (citing Brian Atwood's observation "that disintegrating societies and failed
states... have emerged as the greatest menace to global stability," which he considered a
"strategic threat.") Robert H. Dorff, Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of
Ungovernability, 26(2) PARAMETERS 17 (Summer 1996) available at
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96summer/dorff.htm (last visited Oct. 29,
2005).
314. Cf. Policy Paper, supra note 151, at 7 ("If the ICC has successfully prosecuted the
leaders of a State or organisation, the situation in the country concerned might then be such
as to inspire confidence in the national jurisdiction.").
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